Real Property and Real Estate Transactions by Feinstein, Fred I. & McDermott, Timothy G.
Loyola University Chicago Law Journal
Volume 19
Issue 2 Winter 1988 1986-1987 Illinois Law Survey Article 13
1988
Real Property and Real Estate Transactions
Fred I. Feinstein
Partner, McDermott, Will & Emery, Chicago, IL
Timothy G. McDermott
Follow this and additional works at: http://lawecommons.luc.edu/luclj
Part of the Property Law and Real Estate Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by LAW eCommons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Loyola University Chicago Law
Journal by an authorized administrator of LAW eCommons. For more information, please contact law-library@luc.edu.
Recommended Citation
Fred I. Feinstein, & Timothy G. McDermott, Real Property and Real Estate Transactions, 19 Loy. U. Chi. L. J. 649 (1988).
Available at: http://lawecommons.luc.edu/luclj/vol19/iss2/13
Real Property and Real Estate Transactions
Fred I Feinstein *
and Timothy G. McDermott**
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. INTRODUCTION ................................... 650
II. PROPERTY TAXES ................................. 650
A. Scavenger Tax Sales .......................... 650
B. The Owner's Right to Redeem Following A
Tax Foreclosure Sale ......................... 653
C. Constitutional Challenge to Assessment Based
on Zoning Classification ...................... 654
III. REAL ESTATE BROKERS .......................... 655
A. Broker's Liability for Breach of Duty ......... 655
B. Broker's Right to Commission ................ 658
IV. LANDLORD/TENANT & INSTALLMENT CONTRACT
RELATIONSHIPS ................................... 660
A. Implied Warranty of Habitability ............. 660
B. Liability of Landlord to Third Parties ......... 662
1. Liability for Injuries Caused by Tenant's
A nim als .................................. 662
2. Liability for Criminal Acts of Third
Parties .................................... 663
C. Termination of Relationships ................. 666
1. Actions in Equity. .................. 666
2. Actions under the Lease .............. 667
3. Rescission for Breach of Warranty ........ 668
D. Lease Interpretation .......................... 669
V . ZONING ........................................... 671
A. Generally ..................................... 672
B. Constitutional Decisions ...................... 673
VI. TRANSFERS OF INTERESTS IN PROPERTY .......... 677
* Partner, McDermott, Will & Emery, Chicago, Illinois; B.S.C., 1967, DePaul Uni-
versity; J.D., 1970, DePaul University; Member, Illinois State Bar Association (Council
Chairman, Real Property Section, 1981-1982); Member, American College of Real Estate
Lawyers.
** B.A., 1984, University of Notre Dame; J.D. candidate, 1989, Loyola University
of Chicago.
Loyola University Law Journal
A. Self-made "Land Patent" to Create Superior
Title ......................................... 677
VII. THE ILLINOIS MORTGAGE FORECLOSURE LAW ... 678
A. Structure of the Act .......................... 678
B. Major Aspects r," the Act ...................... 678
1. Instruments Covered by the Act .......... 678
2. Necessary Parties ......................... 679
3. Methods of Terminating a Mortgagor's
Interest in Real Estate .................... 680
4. New Foreclosure Sale Procedure .......... 683
5. Reinstatement and Redemption ........... 685
6. Rights of Possession ...................... 687
VIII. CONCLUSION ...................................... 689
I. INTRODUCTION
The most notable development in Illinois real property law dur-
ing the Survey period involved legislation. The state enacted the
new Illinois Mortgage Foreclosure Law,' which clarified and re-
structured existing law in several notable ways, especially regard-
ing the timing of the foreclosure sale.
Furthermore, Illinois courts addressed many cases involving real
property issues during the Survey year. The Illinois Supreme
Court addressed, among other things, issues involving landlord lia-
bility,2 termination of a lease relationship,' sufficiency of a lease
agreement,4 and real estate tax sales.' Also, several decisions of the
Illinois appellate courts clarified prior supreme court rulings in
many areas.
II. PROPERTY TAXES
A. Scavenger Tax Sales
In In re Application of Rosewell,6 the Illinois Supreme Court ad-
dressed notice and due process issues arising under the Scavenger
Act.7 In Rosewell, the Cook County assessor mailed a notice to the
1. See infra notes 253-359 and accompanying text.
2. See infra notes 116-46 and accompanying text.
3. See infra notes 147-53 and accompanying text.
4. See infra notes 183-95 and accompanying text.
5. See infra notes 6-20 and accompanying text.
6. 117 III. 2d 479, 512 N.E.2d 1256 (1987).
7. Id. at 485, 512 N.E.2d at 1258 (citing ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 120, para. 716(a)
(1983)). The court stated:
The Scavenger Act requires the county collector to "publish an advertisement
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assessee of record for certain parcels of real estate. The notice
stated that the parcels had escaped assessment for the years 1965
through 1978, and that a hearing for back taxes for those years
would be held." The record on appeal indicated that the assessee
received the notice, but the record did not show whether the as-
sessee attended the hearing. Following the hearing, the collector
issued a bill for the back taxes. The bill was not paid, and subse-
quently the county collector published notice of his intention to file
for judgment and order of sale. The circuit court entered a judg-
ment and order of sale on May 6, 1983. 9
One month late-r, the taxpayer filed a petition to vacate the judg-
ment and order. The taxpayer alleged that no notice of the pro-
ceeding had been sent by mail and, therefore, that the court
improperly invoked its jurisdiction. 0 The circuit court denied the
petition, and on appeal, the appellate court reversed after deter-
mining that notice by mail to the taxpayer was required."
The supreme court determined that the county's long-standing
giving notice of the intended application for judgment for sale of all tracts of
lands and lots upon which all or a part of the general taxes for each of 5 or more
years are delinquent as of the date of the advertisement."
Id. (citing ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 120, para. 706 (1983)).
The appellate court concluded that the notice provision of the Revenue Act, which
requires that "the Collector shall publish an advertisement, giving notice of the intended
application for judgment for sale of such delinquent land and lots," ILL. REv. STAT. ch.
120, para. 711 (1983), and the United States Constitution required notice by mail to the
taxpayer before a court could grant a default judgment of sale for unpaid taxes. In re
Application of Rosewell, 139 I11. App. 3d 482, 486, 487 N.E.2d 952, 955 (1st Dist. 1985).
Following the appellate court decision, the county collector suspended Cook County
scavenger sales pending the Illinois Supreme Court's final resolution of whether notice by
mail was required. Rosewell, 117 III. 2d at 492, 512 N.E.2d at 1257. The supreme court
stated that the suspension of the scavenger sales scomcd unnccessary because the collec-
tor could ha,,e complied with the appellate court's holding by sending a notice of the
scavenger sale by registered or certified mail to taxpayers. Id. The county assessor, how-
ever, had not held a scavenger sale since 1983 because of the potential cloud over titles
conveyed in such sales and the resulting negative effect on bidders. Id. at 484, 512
N.E.2d at 1258.
8. Id. at 482, 512 N.E.2d at 1257.
9. Id.
10. Id. at 482-83, 512 N.E.2d at 1257.
11. Id. at 483, 512 N.E.2d at 1257. The taxpayer, who appealed from the order of
sale, had since paid the amount of tax sought by the county. Furthermore, the evidence
did not indicate that the property had been sold or offered for sale at the 1983 scavenger
sale. Id. at 484, 512 N.E.2d at 1258. The supreme court, therefore, concluded that any
issue regarding the parties' rights against each other was moot. Id. Nevertheless, in
order to remove the potential cloud over titles that had led to the cancellation of scaven-
ger sales in Cook County since 1983, the supreme court accepted the case to determine
the notice requirements under the Scavenger Act. Id. at 484-85, 512 N.E.2d at 1258.
The court determined that the public importance of renewing the scavenger sales consti-
tuted a "narrow exception to the mootness doctrine." Id.
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interpretation that the Scavenger Act did not require notice by
mail was reasonable.' 2 The court, therefore, held that the Act did
not require notice by mail of applications for judgment under the
Act.' 3 The court noted that the Revenue Act, which provides for
the annual sale of tax delinquent properties, requires that notice be
mailed to assessees of property subject to annual sale.' 4 The tax-
payer contended that consistencies in the language used in the
Scavenger Act and the Revenue Act indicated a legislative intent
that the notice provisions for the latter act should apply to the
former act. ' The supreme court, however, accepted the collector's
argument that the county's long-standing interpretation of the
Scavenger Act was not unreasonable given the ambiguous wording
of the statute.' 6 The court, therefore, concluded that the statute
did not mandate notice by mail of applications for judgment under
the Scavenger Act.' 7
The taxpayer also contended that the fourteenth amendment to
the United States Constitution required notice by mail.'8  The
court distinguished prior case law' 9 and concluded that, in the con-
text of all the notices and other safeguards provided by the Reve-
nue Act, the failure to provide notice by mail of a scavenger
application is not "unreasonable" within the meaning of the four-
teenth amendment.20
12. Id. at 487, 512 N.E.2d at 1259.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 486, 512 N.E.2d at 1259. The Revenue Act requires "notice by mail of
application for judgment for sale of delinquent lands or lots." Id. (quoting ILL. REV.
STAT. ch. 120, para. 706 (1983) (emphasis in original)).
15. Id.
16. Id. at 487, 512 N.E.2d at 1259. The court noted that the wording of the require-
ment of mailed notice "tracks precisely" the wording of the annual sale provision in the
Revenue Act, but not the wording of the Scavenger Act. The court, therefore, reasoned
that the legislative intent regarding the notice provision was ambiguous. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id. The taxpayer cited for support Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust,
339 U.S. 306 (1950) (requiring notice "reasonably calculated ... to apprise the parties" of
hearings that finally affect a deprivation), and Mennonite Bd. of Missions v. Adams, 462
U.S. 791 (1983) (prohibiting a tax sale under Indiana law unless notice of the hearing in
which an order of sale might be entered had been mailed to the mortgagee). Rosewell, 117
I1l. 2d at 487, 512 N.E.2d at 1259.
19. Rosewell, 117 Ill. 2d at 488-89, 512 N.E.2d at 1260 (distinguishing Mullane, 339
U.S. 306 (1950), and Mennonite, 462 U.S. 791 (1983)). The court, in distinguishing
Rosewell, stated that "the interests of the owner and mortgagee are not affected until the
issuance of a tax deed," and furthermore, such a "deed will not issue until the redemption
period-with its attendant notices in person, by mail and through publication-has
passed, and a petition for a tax deed-with its own stringent notice requirements-has
been made and acted upon." Id. at 488-89, 512 N.E.2d at 1260.
20. Id. at 489, 512 N.E.2d at 1260. The court also rejected the taxpayer's argument
[Vol. 19
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B. The Owner's Right to Redeem Following
A Tax Foreclosure Sale
In In the Matter of the Application of Rosewell ("Rosewell 2"),21
the Illinois Appellate Court for the First District addressed the is-
sue of the owner's right to redeem following a tax foreclosure sale.
In Rosewell 2, the Phoenix Bond & Indemnity Co. ("Phoenix")
purchased real estate at a 1979 annual tax sale pursuant to section
272 of the Illinois Revenue Act of 1939.22 Phoenix purchased the
parcel of real estate on November 31, 1981.23 The purchased prop-
erty was subject to a redemption period which ran to November
14, 1983. Subsequently, a deputy county clerk erroneously
changed tl~e redemption date to February 15, 1984.4 The Federal
Deposit Insurance Corp. (the "FDIC"), the assignee in liquidation
of the legal owner of the land trust holding the property, received
an original notice of the November 14, 1983 redemption date, and
then received three notices of the February 15, 1984 date. The
FDIC redeemed the property during the erroneously extended re-
demption period. Phoenix brought suit to expunge the FDIC's re-
demption, and to obtain an order directing the clerk to issue a tax
deed to Phoenix. 2 The trial court granted FDIC's motion for
summary judgment and granted the assessor's motion to dismiss
Pheonix's petition for a tax deed.26
On appeal, the Illinois Appellate Court for the First District
stated that, because the law favors redemption, it would construe
redemption laws liberally unless injury resulted to the purchaser at
the sale. Further, the court noted that the purchaser's right to a
deed was inferior to the owner's right to redeem. 2 The court rea-
soned that, because the right to redeem was a substantial right, a
that the interest in receiving notice of a hearing on the application for a tax sale was a
protected property interest under the Illinois Constitution of which the taxpayer was
deprived unconstitutionally because the notice was insufficient. Id. at 491, 512 N.E.2d at
1261.
21. 148 Ill. App. 3d 297, 498 N.E.2d 790 (1st Dist. 1986).
22. Id. at 299, 498 N.E.2d 791 (citing ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 120, para. 753 (1981)
(amended 1985)). Section 272 provided for the purchase of properties for delinquent real
estate taxes, yet allowed for a redemption of the property within a certain period. Id. at
300, 498 N.E.2d at 791 (citing ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 120, para. 753(2) (1981)(amended
1985)).
23. Id. at 299, 498 N.E.2d at 791.
24. Id. at 300, 498 N.E.2d at 792.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 299, 498 N.E.2d at 791.
27. Id. at 303, 498 N.E.2d at 794.
28. Id.
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person should not lose that right by mistake or misinterpretation. 9
Focusing on the mistake by a public official and the FDIC's good
faith reliance on that mistake, the court concluded that the trial
court properly exercised its equitable powers in allowing redemp-
tion after the statutory period had run. a"
C. Constitutional Challenge to Assessment Based
on Zoning Classification
In DuPage Bank & Trust v. Property Tax Appeal Board,3' the
plaintiff contended that the defendant's improper refusal to zone
plaintiff's property as farm land resulted in improper taxation on
that property.32 The plaintiff argued that the real estate taxes on
the property violated the Illinois and United States Constitutions
on uniformity33 and equal protection 34 grounds. The court held
that the taxes were constitutional because they uniformly affected
the class of similarly zoned. roperties upon which they operated.35
Further, the court held that the taxes did not offend the equal pro-
tection clause because the taxation scheme treated members of the
same class similarly.3 6
29. Id. at 303-04, 498 N.E.2d at 794.
30. Id. at 304, 498 N.E.2d at 794.
31. 151 II1. App. 3d 624, 502 N.E.2d 1250 (2d Dist. 1986).
32. Id. at 626, 502 i.E.2d at 1252. The plaintiff argued that the different zoning
classifications of similar properties surrounding the plaintiff's property resulted in a lack
of uniform taxation, in violation of constitutional requirements. Id.
33. Id. at 628, 502 N.E.2d at 1253. The plaintiff contended that the wide disparity in
assessed values of similar, though differently classified, parcels constituted a violation of
the uniformity clause of the 1970 Illinois Constitution. Id. The uniformity clause states
that, "[e]xcept as otherwise provided in this Section, taxes upon real property shall be
levied u;I-f ,rmly by valuation ascertained as the General Assembly shall provide by law."
ILL. CONST. art. IX, § 4(a).
34. DuPage Bank & Trust, 151 Iil. App. 3d at 628, 502 N.E.2d at 1253. The plaintiff
argued that the differences between the assessed value of his property and the assessed
values of comparable properties resulted in a violation of the Equal Protection Clause of
the United States Constitution. Id. (citing U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1).
35. Id.
36. Id. The Illinois Appellate Court for the Second District decided another case
confronting a constitutional issue in the area of property taxation in Lake County Bd. of
Review v. Property Tax Appeal Bd., 152 Il. App, 3d 1093, 504 N.E.2d 1333 (2d Dist.
1987), which involved a taxpayer's right to due process of law regarding the taking of
property. The court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to
order the county treasurer to rebate the taxpayer's refund directly to the taxpayer rather
than offsetting that refund against the taxpayer's existing obligation to pay subsequent
taxes. Id. at 1099, 504 N.E.2d at 1337.
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III. REAL ESTATE BROKERS
A. Broker's Liability for Breach of Duty
In Stefani v. Baird & Warner,37 the Illinois Appellate Court for
the First District considered whether the defendant, a broker, vio-
lated provisions of the Real Estate License Act. 8 In Stefani, the
plaintiffs contacted an employee of the defendant-real estate broker
for assistance in purchasing a residence.3 9 The parties orally
agreed that the broker would be the plaintiffs' agent, but that the
broker would receive its commission from the seller. Subsequently,
the plaintiffs, through the broker's employee, became involved in
negotiations with a seller.4
During these negotiations, another employee of the broker con-
tacted a third party and received a higher offer for the purchase of
the seller's property.4 ' The broker failed to advise the plaintiffs of
the broker's representation of the third party or of the third party's
offer. Subsequently, the seller listed the property with the broker.
On the same day, the broker arranged a sale between the seller and
the third party, and received a commission from both.42
The appellate court, affirming the trial court, held that the plain-
tiffs failed to state a cause of action under the Real Estate License
Act.4 3 The plaintiffs relied on a 1982 Illinois Supreme Court deci-
sion' which held that a private right of action existed under the
broker's licensing statute. 4' The Stefani court determined, subse-
quent to that decision, and while the present case was pending, that
the General Assembly had amended the Real Estate License Act.
37. 157 111. App. 3d 167, 510 N.E.2d 65 (1st Dist. 1987).
38. Id. at 170, 510 N.E.2d at 67 (citing ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 111, paras. 5818(e)(1),
(3), (5), (15), (18) (1985)). The court also considered whether the broker breached its
fiduciary duty to the plaintiffs or violated the Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business
Practices Act. Id. (citing ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 121 1/2, para. 262 (1985) (amended
1986)).
39. Id. at 169, 510 N.E.2d at 67.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 170, 510 N.E.2d at 67.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 174, 510 N.E.2d at 70. At the same time, however, the appellate court
partially reversed the trial court, holding that the plaintiffs sufficiently stated causes of
action for breach of fiduciary duty and violation of the Consumer Fraud and Deceptive
Business Practices Act. Id. at 173, 175, 510 N.E.2d at 69, 70-71 (citing ILL. REV. STAT.
ch. 121 1/2, para. 262 (1985) (amended 1986)).
44. Sawyer Realty Group v. Jarvis Corp., 89 111. 2d 379, 432 N.E.2d 849 (1982) (a
private right of action could be implied from the express provision of the broker's licens-
ing statute).
45. SteJani, 157 III. App. 3d at 174, 510 N.E.2d at 70 (citing Sawyer, 89 Ill. 2d 379,
432 N.E.2d 849).
1988]
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This amendment expressly provided that no private right of action
arose under the Act. 6 The Stefani court concluded, therefore, that
the amendment to the Real Estate Licensing Act barred the plain-
tiffs' action. 7
The Illinois Appellate Court for the First District decided Zim-
merman v. Northfield Real Estate, Inc.,48 which also addressed
whether a private right of action existed under the broker's licens-
ing act.49 In Zimmerman, the plaintiffs purchased a single family
residence from the defendant-sellers. The defendant-broker repre-
sented the sellers in the transaction. 0 After the purchase was com-
plete, the plaintiffs discovered that the lot was forty percent smaller
than the one acre size that the broker's listing had claimed.5 Fur-
ther, the property suffered from severe flooding problems.5 2
Although the broker had knowledge of the flooding, the broker
failed to inform the plaintiffs of the problem. 3 The trial court dis-
missed the plaintiffs' complaint, and the plaintiffs appealed.54 The
appellate court determined that the broker had a duty imposed by
the Real Estate Brokers and Sellers Licensing Act ("REBSLA") 5
to disclose material facts to all purchasers.5 6
In Zimmerman, the appellate court reviewed the same 1982 Illi-
nois Supreme Court decision57 cited in Stefani 58 and held that the
46. Id. The Real Estate License Act was amended to provide that "[n]othing in this
Act shall be construed to grant any person a private right of action for damages to en-
force the provisions of this Act." ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 11, para. 5832 (1985) (amended
1986).
47. Stefani, 157 Ii. App. 3d at 174, 510 N.E.2d at 70. The court noted that the
amendment unconditionally repealed any private right of action under the remedial act
without a savings clause. The court held that the amendment stopped all pending ac-
tions, including the present one, at the time the amendment became effective. Id.
48. 156 Ill. App. 3d 154, 510 N.E.2d 409 (1st Dist. 1986).
49. Id. at 158, 510 N.E.2d at 411.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 162, 510 N.E.2d at 414.
52. Id. at 161-62, 510 N.E.2d at 413.
53. Id. at 161, 510 N.E.2d at 413.
54. Id. at 158, 510 N.E.2d at 411.
55. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 111, para. 5701 (1981) (repealed 1984).
56. Zimmerman, 156 Ill. App. 3d at 168, 510 N.E.2d at 418. On appeal, the Zim-
merman court also determined that the brokers' misrepresentations and omissions were
material because the plaintiffs could be expected to rely on them. Furthermore, the court
found that plaintiffs did in fact rely to theii detriment on the misrepresentations and
omissions. Id. at 162, 510 N.E.2d at 414. Hence, the court concluded that dismissal of
plaintiffs' cause of action for common law fraud was improper. Id. at 163, 510 N.E.2d at
414.
57. Sawyer Realty Group v. Jarvis Corp., 89 Ill. 2d 379, 432 N.E.2d 849 (1982).
58. 157 Ill. App. 3d 167, 510 N.E.2d 65. For a discussion of Stefani, see supra notes
37-47 and accompanying text.
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plaintiffs had a private right of action under the REBSLA.59 The
Zimmerman court did not mention the amendment to the statute,
which, according to the Stefani court, eliminated a private right of
action under REBSLA. ° Thus, the appellate court concluded that
the plaintiffs sufficiently alleged the broker's failure to disclose all
material knowledge and that the trial court erred in dismissing
plaintiffs' action.6
In Jeffrey Allen Industries v. Sheldon F. Good & Company, 2 the
plaintiff alleged that the defendant-broker breached its duty to in-
form the plaintiff, its principal, of material facts within its knowl-
edge. 63 The broker failed to inform its principal that a third party,
provided by another broker, was preparing an offer for the plain-
tiff's house on more favorable terms than the offer provided by the
plaintiff's broker.64 To avoid splitting its commission with the
other broker, the plaintiff's broker closed the deal with the less
valuable offer. 65 The Illinois Court of Appeals for the First Dis-
trict held that the broker-agent's failure to disclose the third-party
offer constituted a breach of that broker's duty to inform the seller
59. Zimmerman, 156 11. App. 3d at 165, 510 N.E.2d at 416.
60. See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
61. Zimmerman, 156 111. App. 3d at 168, 510 N.E.2d at 418. The appellate court also
concluded that, although the trial court properly dismissed the plaintiffs' negligent mis-
representation cause of action against defendant-sellers, the plaintiffs properly stated a
cause of action for negligent misrepresentation against the defendant-brokers. Id. at 163-
64, 510 N.E.2d at 415. The court reasoned that, because the brokers were in the business
of supplying information for the guidance of others, the brokers could be liable for the
plaintiffs' economic loss. Also, the court determined that an exculpatory clause in the
real estate contract was invalid because it violated a public policy that the public should
be protected from incapable or dishonest persons. Id. at 165-66, 510 N.E.2d at 416.
Further, the court concluded that the Consumer Fraud Act applied to intentional mis-
representations made by the brokers to prospective purchasers. The court stated that,
because the plaintiffs had sufficiently stated a cause of action for common law fraud, the
plaintiffs stated a sufficient cause of action under the Consumer Fraud Act. Id. at 168,
510 N.E.2d at 418.
62. 153 Ii. App. 3d 120, 505 N.E.2d 1104 (1st Dist. 1987).
63. Id. at 122, 505 N.E.2d at 1105.
64. Id. at 123, 505 N.E.2d at 1105-06. The plaintiff entered into an exclusive broker-
age agreement with the defendant, which provided for a broker's commission and reim-
bursement of advertising expenses upon sale. The agreement provided that if a
cooperating broker supplied the buyer, the defendant was to split the commission evenly
with that broker. The broker failed to inform plaintiff of a third party's three inspections
of the property or the same third party's statement that he was preparing an all cash
offer; a cooperating broker supplied the third party. Subsequently, the plaintiff agreed to
sell to a buyer supplied by the defendant for $350,000 at terms including monthly pay-
ments and a five year balloon note. The next day, the defendant-broker rejected the third
party's all cash offer of $350,000, because the property already had been sold to the
buyer. Id. at 122-23, 505 N.E.2d at 1105-06.
65. Id. at 123, 505 N.E.2d at 1106.
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of material facts that may affect the transaction.66
B. Broker's Right to Commission
In Otto Real Estate v. Shelter Investment,67 the court considered
whether a broker was entitled to partial compensation based on the
modified terms of a sale.68 In Otto, the defendant contacted the
plaintiff's agent and offered the plaintiff a $50,000 broker's com-
mission if the plaintiff obtained a buyer for both of the defendant's
apartment complexes. 69 The plaintiff arranged a meeting between
the defendant and the eventual purchaser of only one of defend-
ant's apartment complexes.70 Although the purchase was com-
pleted with ongoing assistance from the broker, the defendant
refused to pay the broker a commission because only one of the
properties was sold.7 The broker sued to recover a partial
commission.72
The court held that an implied-in-fact contract existed,73 which
made the defendant-seller liable to the broker for a commission
under general agency principles.74 The court noted the general rule
that a principal's acceptance of a broker's different service, know-
ing that the broker expects compensation for that service, creates a
promise by the principal to pay at a reasonable rate.7 5 The court
reasoned that, although the plaintiff was to provide a buyer for the
properties in tandem, the defendant's sale of the individual prop-
erty to the buyer provided by the plaintiff constituted an implied-
in-fact contract.76 The court concluded, therefore, that the defend-
ant was liable under the implied contract.77
In Cinman v. Reliance Savings & Loan Association,78 the Illinois
66. Id. at 124, 505 N.E.2d at 1107.
67. 153 111. App. 3d 756, 506 N.E.2d 351 (4th Dist. 1987).
68. Id. at 759, 506 N.E.2d at 353.
69. Id. at 758, 506 N.E.2d at 352.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 758, 506 N.E.2d at 352-53.
72. Id. at 758, 506 N.E.2d at 353.
73. Id. at 759, 506 N.E.2d at 353.
74. Id. at 761, 506 N.E.2d at 355.
75. Id. at 760, 506 N.E.2d at 354 (citing 3 A. CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 567, at 318
(1960)).
76. Id. at 760-61, 506 N.E.2d at 354.
77. Id. at 761, 506 N.E.2d at 354. The case was remanded for a determination of the
proper amount of damages. The trial court erroneously based the original calculation of
damages on a theory of in quantum meruit, whereas the proper measure should have been
calculated based on general agency principles. Id. at 762, 506 N.E.2d at 355. See also
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) AGENCY § 447 (1958).
78. 155 III. App. 3d 417, 508 N.E.2d 239 (Ist Dist. 1987).
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Appellate Court for the First District considered two consolidated
cases. In Cinman, the broker delivered to the defendant the pur-
chaser's letter which confirmed the terms of a prior telephone con-
versation. 79  Later, following further negotiations and several
delays, the defendant's attorney told the broker that the deal was
off and that there was no contract.80 The trial court consolidated
the purchaser's action for specific performance of the alleged con-
tract for the sale of defendant's building with the broker's action
for a commission on the proposed sale.8' The trial court found
that a valid contract existed and ordered the defendant to specifi-
cally perform the contract. The trial court also granted the broker
a commission."
On appeal, the court addressed two questions. First, the court
addressed the question of specific performance.8 3 The court re-
quired, as a prerequisite for specific performance, a clear and pre-
cise understanding by the parties of the terms of the contract.8 4
Although the letter contained the essential terms of the parties'
agreement, the court fovid that the letter contemplated further ne-
gotiations between the parties, and that the parties did continue to
negotiate material &eements of the proposal for a long period of
time after the writing of the letter.85 The court, therefore, con-
cluded that the trial court erred in ordering specific performance
based on the letter. 86
The court then turned to the question of the broker's commis-
sion. A real estate broker generally is entitled to a commission if
he produces a buyer who is ready, willing, and able to make the
79. Id. at 420, 508 N.E.2d at 241. The letter described the property and included the
following terms: a sales price of $1,620,000; a down payment of $340,000 consisting of a
$100,000 payment at closing and $240,000 to be paid within ninety days of closing; a
$1,280,000 mortgage from the defendant at 12.25% interest to be amortized over twenty-
nine years; a commitment fee of $25,600 and an option for the defendant to buy back the
property at the end of ten years for $2,050,000. Id. at 420, 508 N.E.2d at 241-42. The
letter also memorialized other aspects of the parties' negotiations and was signed by the
parties. Id.
80. Id. at 420-21, 508 N.E.2d at 242.
81. Id. at 418, 508 N.E.2d at 240.
82. Id.
83. Specific performance is "[t]he remedy of performance of a contract in the specific
form in which it was made ... where damages would be inadequate compensation for the
breach of [the contract]." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1024 (5th ed. 1979).
84. Cinman, 155 Ill. App. 3d at 423-24, 508 N.E.2d at 244 (citing Carver v. Brien,
315 Ill. App. 643, 43 N.E.2d 597 (1st Dist. 1942)).
85. Id. at 424-25, 508 N.E.2d at 244-45.
86. Id. at 426, 508 N.E.2d at 245.
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purchase. 7 In this case, however, the parties had agreed that a
commission would be due only if the contract for sale was
formed.8" Because the appellate court found that a contract was
not formed, it concluded that the trial court erred in awarding a
commission to the broker.8 9
IV. LANDLORD/TENANT & INSTALLMENT
CONTRACT RELATIONSHIPS
A. Implied Warrantv of Habitability
During the Survey period, the Illinois appellate courts consid-
ered three cases involving the implied wa:ranty of habitability. In
two of these cases, Abram v. Litman 90 and Housing Authority v.
Melvin, 91 the court considered the implied warranty in light of
Glasoe v. Trinkle,9" a 1985 Illinois Supreme Court decision that
expanded the application of the implied warranty of habitability to
all residential leases.93 The other case, Fischer v. G & S Builders,94
detailed what a purchaser must prove in order to establish a cause
of action for breach of the implied warranty of habitability.95
In Abram v. Litman,9 6 the plaintiff leased property from the de-
fendant pursuant to an oral lease. 97 A fire on the premises dam-
aged the plaintiff's personal property. The plaintiff alleged that the
fire resulted from faulty wiring, which was a defect rendering the
premises uninhabitable and unreasonably dangerous. 8 The court
reasoned that if the defect was of a latent nature and the landlord
did not receive actual notice from the tenant, or have actual or
constructive knowledge of the defect, the landlord could not be
held liable for breach of the implied warranty.9 9 The court con-
cluded, therefore, that the complaint was dismissed properly be-
87. Id. (citing United Investors, Inc. v. Tsotsos, 132 I11. App. 3d 175, 477 N.E.2d 40
(1st Dist. 1985)).
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. 150 Ill. App. 3d 174, 501 N.E.2d 370 (4th Dist. 1986).
91. 154 IU1. App. 3d 999, 507 N.E.2d 1289 (5th Dist. 1987).
92. 107 I11. 2d 1, 479 N.E.2d 915 (1985).
93. Glasoe, 107 II1. 2d at 10, 479 N.E.2d at 918. See also J. Chatz & K. Hazel, Real
Property and Real Estate Transactions, 1985-86 Illinois Law Survey, 18 Loy. U. CHI. L.J.
743, 744-48 (1986).
94. 147 I11. App. 3d 168, 497 N.E.2d 1022 (3d Dist. 1986).
95. See infra notes 111-15 and accompanying text.
96. 150 11. App. 3d 174, 501 N.E.2d 370 (4th Dist. 1986).
97. Abram, 150 I11. App. 3d at 175, 501 N.E.2d at 370.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 178, 501 N.E.2d at 372. The Abram court distinguished Glasoe v. Trinkle,
which addressed a situation involving patent defects, based on Abram's allegation of a
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cause the plaintiff failed to allege that the landlord was on notice of
the defects. 00
In Housing Authority v. Melvin, 10 the Illinois Appellate Court
for the Fifth District determined the appropriate method for calcu-
lating the rent reduction for a breach of the implied warranty of
habitability when the contract rent amount was the result of fed-
eral assistance and did not represent fair market value. 0 2 In Mel-
vin, the tenant rented an apartment in a public housing
development for sixty-two dollars per month. The rent was deter-
mined by a formula based on the tenant's income. 0 3 The tenant
stopped paying rent because the landlord failed to make requested
repairs. 1° 4 The landlord filed an action for possession and rent
due. 10 5 The trial court found that the tenant was liable for the fair
rental value of the premises while she remained in possession and
granted judgment for the landlord. The tenant appealed."' 6
The Melvin court considered two methods of calculating the ap-
propriate rent reduction for breach of the implied warranty of hab-
itability. 0 7  The reduction can be calculated based on the
percentage of reduction in value, 08 or the percentage of reduction
in use.1°' The court concluded that because the contract rent was
latent defect in the wiring. Id. at 177, 501 N.E.2d at 372 (citing Glasoe v. Trinkle, 107
Ill. 2d 1, 479 N.E.2d 915 (1985)).
100. Id. at 178, 501 N.E.2d at 372. Further, the court held that "the implied war-
ranty of habitability cannot serve as the basis for recovery of property damages." Id.
101. 154 Ill. App. 3d 999, 507 N.E.2d 1289 (5th Dist. 1987).
102. Id. at 1005, 507 N.E.2d at 1293-94.
103. Id. at 1000, 507 N.E.2d at 1290.
104. Id. at 1001, 507 N.E.2d at 1291. In the event that repairs were not made, the
lease provided for an abatement of rent in proportion to the seriousness of the damage
and loss in the value as a dwelling. Id. at 1000, 507 N.E.2d at 1291.
105. Id. at 999, 507 N.E.2d at 1290. Two months after the landlord filed this action,
a city housing inspector disapproved the apartment for occupancy. Id. at 1000, 507
N.E.2d 1290. Evidence indicated that the unit had the following problems: no lavatory,
falling ceiling plaster, wires hanging from the junction box, live wires hanging from the
leaky living room ceiling, a front door that could not be locked, rats, and a leaky bathtub.
Id. at 1000, 507 N.E.2d 1290-91.
106. Id. at 1003, 479 N.E.2d at 1291-92.
107. Id. at 1005, 507 N.E.2d at 1293-94 (citing Glasoe v. Trinkle, 107 11. 2d 1, 479
N.E.2d 915 (1985)).
108. The percentage reduction in value can be calculated two different ways. Under
the first calculation,
the tenant's damages are measured by the difference between the fair rental
value of the premises if they had been as warranted and their fair value during
their occupancy .... Under the second[, ... the tenant's damages are mea-
sured by the difference between the agreed rent and the fair rental value of the
premises during their occupancy.
Id.
109. Id. The percentage reduction in use calculation "reduces the tenant's rent by a
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the result of federal assistance and bore no relationship to fair mar-
ket value, the appropriate method was the percentage reduction in
use method. I "
In Fischer v. G & S Builders, "the Illinois Appellate Court for
the Third District evaluated the sufficiency of an installment con-
tract purchaser's cause of action for breach of the implied warranty
of habitability. In Fischer, the parties executed an installment con-
tract for the purchase of a home." 2 Three weeks before the bal-
loon payment of $44,589.56 was due, the plaintiffs filed an action
for breach of the implied warranty of habitability, fraud, and de-
ceptive trade practices." 3 The court found that the lessee failed to
prove that "the home had a latent defect caused by improper de-
sign, material or workmanship in its construction which rendered
the property unsuitable for use as a home."'' 4 The court, there-
fore, held that the plaintiffs failed to establish a cause of action for
breach of the implied warranty of habitability." 5
B. Liability of Landlord to Third Parties
1. Liability for Injuries Caused by Tenant's Animals
In Steinberg v. Petta,16 the Illinois Supreme Court addressed
whether an absentee-landlord could be held liable as one who
harbors a dog under the Dog Bite Statute" 17 for injuries inflicted on
a third party by the tenants' dog." I8 The court held that the absen-
tee landlord did not exercise the necessary degree of care, custody,
or control over the dog to qualify as an "owner" under the
percentage reflecting the diminution in the value and enjoyment of the premises by reason
of the existence of defects which give rise to the breach of implied warranty of habitabil-
ity." Id. at 1005, 507 N.E.2d at 1294.
110. Id. at 1007, 507 N.E.2d at 1295. The court indicated that the application of the
percentage reduction in use method reduces the need for expensive expert testimony,
because the determination of the percentage reduction in use of a residence is within the
capability of the layman. Id.
111. 147 Ill. App. 3d 168, 497 N.E.2d 1022 (3d Dist. 1986).
112. Id. at 170, 497 N.E.2d at 1023.
113. Id. The plaintiffs based their claims on allegations of a sewer gas odor which
permeated the house, a continual accumulation of water which soaked the basement car-
pet, and seven violations of the Illinois State Plumbing Code. Id. at 174, 497 N.E.2d at
1026.
114. Id. at 175, 497 N.E.2d at 1027. The court noted that the alleged defects were
not latent but, in fact, were noticed by the plaintiffs when they originally inspected the
home before their purchase. Id. at 176, 497 N.E.2d at 1027.
115. Id. at 175-76, 497 N.E.2d at 1027.
116. 114 Ill. 2d 496, 501 N.E.2d 1263 (1986).
117. Id. at 501, 501 N.E.2d at 1265 (citing ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 8, para. 366 (1983)).
118. Id.
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statute. 119
In Steinberg, the tenants obtained permission from the manager
of a house owned by an absentee-landlord to build a fence to con-
tain the tenants' dog. 2 ' After several neighbors and another ten-
ant complained to the manager about the dog being noisy, messy,
and bothersome, the manager spoke to the tenants about the
animal.' 2' Subsequently, the plaintiff, an eleven-year-old boy,
leaned over the fence, and the dog bit him. 22
After reviewing the pertinent statutory language, 23 the court
reasoned that a landlord does not "harbor" a dog, and hence, is not
an "owner" under the Dog Bite Statute, unless that landlord exer-
cises "some measure of care, custody, or control" over the dog.12 4
The court then noted that the mere fact that the defendant, acting
through his manager, allowed the tenants to erect a fence and keep
a dog on the premises did not establish the necessary degree of
care, custody, or control required under the statute. 125 The court
refused to expand the scope of the Dog Bite Statute 2 6 and con-
cluded that the landlord was not liable to the third party for inju-
ries caused by the tenants' dog. 127
2. Liability for Criminal Acts of Third Parties
In Duncavage v. Allen, 28 the Illinois Appellate Court for the
First District addressed landlord liability for the criminal acts of
third parties in the context of a motion to dismiss. In Duncavage, a
criminal hid in overgrown weeds near an unlighted exit area on the
defendant's property.129  The criminal then climbed a ladder,
which the defendant stored in the yard, and entered the tenant's
119. Id. at 502, 501 N.E.2d at 1266.
120. Id. at 498, 501 N.E.2d at 1264.
121. Id. at 498-99, 501 N.E.2d at 1264.
122. Id. at 498, 501 N.E.2d at 1264.
123. Id. at 501, 501 N.E.2d at 1265. The Dog Bite Statute provided that an "owner"
is "any person ... who keeps or harbors a dog or other animal, or who has it in his care,
or acts as its custoeian, or who knowingly permits a dog or other domestic animal to
remain on or about any premises occupied by him." ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 8, para. 352.16
(1983).
124. Steinberg, 114 911. 2d at 501, 501 N.E.2d at 1265.
125. Id. at 502, 501 N.E.2d at 1266. Any benefits that the landlord received as a
result of erecting the fence "were merely incidental to the tenants' activity." Id.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 502-03, 501 N.E.2d at 1267. See also Smith v. Gleason, 152 Ill. App. 3d
346, 349, 504 N.E.2d 240, 242 (2d Dist. 1987) (drawing an analogy to Steinberg, the
court refused to find the defendant-lessor liable after the lessee's horse escaped from the
defendant-lessor's property and struck the plaintiff's car).
128. 147 II!. App. 3d 88, 497 N.E.2d 433 (1st Dist. 1986).
129. Id. at 92, 497 N.E.2d at 435.
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apartment through a window that could not be locked. After en-
tering the apartment, the criminal attacked and killed the tenant,
the plaintiff's decedent. 3 ' Upon review of an order granting the
landlord's motion to dismiss, the appellate court determined that
the murder of the tenant was "not so unforeseeable as to make the
question of proximate cause a matter of law."'13' Further, the court
concluded that the landlord owed the tenant a duty of reasonable
care to protect her from criminal acts of third parties when prior
criminal activity has occurred. 3 2 Moreover, the court concluded
that the landlord also owed the tenant a duty of reasonable care
under applicable building codes. 33  Accordingly, the court re-
versed the order granting the landlord's motion to dismiss. 34
The appellate court's conclusion regarding the duty imposed by
building codes may lend itself to a broader range of cases than
merely those cases that mirror the Duncavage fact patterns. 1  The
court reasoned that the harm which occurred 136 was the type of
harm that the Chicago Building and Housing Code was intended
130. Id.
131. Id. at 97, 497 N.E.2d at 438. The court indicated that proximate cause is gener-
ally a question of fact for the jury. Id. at 96, 497 N.E.2d at 437. The court stated that
proximate cause depended on whether the landlord reasonably should have foreseen the
intervening criminal act as a natural and probable result of its negligence. Id. at 97, 497
N.E.2d at 438. The court, however, cautioned that the jury need not find that the precise
injury that occurred was foreseeable. Id.
132. Id. at 97, 497 N.E.2d at 438. According to the court, the duty of reasonable
care is imposed on a landlord following the occurrence of "prior incidents similar to the
one complained of and . . . connected with the physical condition of the premises." Id.
(citing Stribling v. Chicago Housing Authority, 34 I11. App. 3d 551, 340 N.E.2d 47 (1st
Dist. 1975)).
In Stribling, burglars entered the tenants' apartment on three occasions by breaking
through the wall between the tenants' apartment and an adjacent vacant apartment.
Stribling, 34 Ill. App. 3d at 554, 340 N.E.2d at 49. After the first burglary, the tenants
informed the landlord of the burglary. Id. The Stribling court imposed liability on the
landlord for his failure to take reasonable precautions against subsequent similar burgla-
ries after receiving notice of the first burglary. Id. at 556, 340 N.E.2d at 50.
Although Stribling has been limited strictly to its facts, the Duncavage court reasoned
that the two cases "embodied the same three factors posed in a motion to dismiss con-
text." Duncavage, 147 I11. App. 3d at 98, 497 N.E.2d at 439. Those three factors are
previous identical criminal activity, notice to the landlord, and connection to the leased
premises. Id. In addition to recognizing the limited applicability of Stribling, the Dun-
cavage court reaffirmed the general rule that a landlord's liability for the criminal acts of
third parties is "limited to criminal intrusions which are reasonably foreseeable." Id. at
103, 497 N.E.2d at 442. The holding in Duncavage, therefore, may be limited to its
narrow facts.
133. Duncavage, 147 Ill. App. 3d at 99, 497 N.E.2d at 439.
134. Id. at 103, 497 N.E.2d at 442.
135. Id. at 99, 497 N.E.2d at 439.
136. The tenant was raped and murdered. Id. at 92, 497 N.E.2d at 435.
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to prevent.'37 Accordingly, the court concluded that the landlord's
alleged code violations 38 raised a jury question regarding actiona-
ble negligence.' 39 Thus, Duncavage arguably expands landlord lia-
bility for the criminal acts of third parties. The court, however,
concluded its opinion by reaffirming the general rule that such lia-
bility is "limited to criminal intrusions which are reasonably
foreseeable." 140
After the Duncavage decision, the Illinois Appellate Court for
the Second District applied the general rule on landlord liability in
Rowe v. State Bank. '4' In Rowe, a criminal entered the defendant-
landlord's office building while the plaintiff worked the midnight to
8:00 a.m. shift inside an office. 142 The landlord alleged that the
door to the office was locked. Nevertheless, the criminal gained
entrance to the office, shot the plaintiff, and killed another
worker. 4 3 The plaintiff alleged that the landlord failed to maintain
the security of the door lock system by neglecting to properly con-
trol access to master keys. 144 The appellate court stated that the
injuries suffered by the plaintiff "must have been more than a sim-
ple possibility;" the injury must have been "foreseeable as likely to
happen by a reasonably prudent person." 45 The court concluded
that, although the landlord did not have strict control of the
master keys, the risk of severe injury to the plaintiff was not rea-
sonably foreseeable at the time. 146
137. Id. at 100, 497 N.E.2d at 440 (citing Gula v. Gawel, 71 111. App. 2d 174, 218
N.E.2d 42 (1st Dist. 1966) (in which the court considered the code as a public safety
measure), and City of Chicago v. Hadesman, 17 II1. App. 2d 150, 149 N.E.2d 425 (1st
Dist. 1958) (in which the court determined that one of the purposes of the code was to
fight crime)).
138. The plaintiff alleged numerous violations of the Chicago Housing and Building
Code, including lack of window screens, defective windows and doors, high weeds, in-
operable or burned out interior and exterior lighting, and the failure to remove refuse and
debris (including the ladder) from the yard. Moreover, the plaintiff alleged that leasing
the apartment while the building was in violation of these building regulations violated
the Chicago Building Code. Duncavage, 147 11. App. 3d at 93, 497 N.E.2d at 435.
139. Id. at 100, 497 N.E.2d at 440.
140. Id. at 103, 497 N.E.2d at 442.
141. 153 Ill. App. 3d 788, 505 N.E.2d 1380 (2d Dist. 1987).
142. Id. at 790, 505 N.E.2d at 1382.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 791, 505 N.E.2d at 1382.
145. Id. at 797, 505 N.E.2d at 1387.
146. Id. The court summarized the three exceptions to the general rule of non-liabil-
ity, as follows:
A landlord may be liable to a tenant if (1) the injury, although due to criminal
activity, occurs because of a condition of the premises [citing Stribling, 34 I11.
App. 3d 551, 340 N.E.2d 47]; (2) the landlord attempts to safeguard the prem-
ises but does so negligently [citing Pippin v. Chicago Housing Authority, 78 Iil.
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C. Termination of Relationships
1. Actions in Equity
In Kanter & Eisenberg v. Madison Associates, 47 the Illinois
Supreme Court addressed whether a tenant could obtain a tempo-
rary injunction restraining a landlord from instituting a forcible
entry and detainer action. 4  The defendant, a landlord, argued
that the plaintiff, a tenant, could pay the disputed rent and then sue
for damages arising from the defendant's allegedly fraudulent mis-
representations. ' 4 9 The plaintiff argued that if he paid the disputed
rent, then the "voluntary payment doctrine"'' 5 would foreclose
any legal remedy otherwise available to the plaintiff.'5' The court
expressly rejected the plaintiff's interpretation of the voluntary
payment doctrine, which would require all tenants to request pre-
liminary injunctive relief before instituting actions to recover dis-
puted rent payments. 52 The court then concluded that the
plaintiff had an adequate remedy at law and, because no showing
of irreparable harm was made, the plaintiff could not receive pre-
liminary injunctive relief.'
2d 204, 399 N.E.2d 596 (1979)]; or (3) the landlord, by his acts, creates a haz-
ard which did not previously exist [citing Cross v. Wells Fargo Alarm Services,
82 I11. 2d 313, 412 N.E.2d 472 (1980)].
Rowe, 153 Ill. App. 3d at 794-95, 505 N.E.2d at 1385.
147. 116 I11. 2d 506, 508 N.E.2d 1053 (1987).
148. Id. at 511, 508 N.E.2d at 1055. The defendant served the plaintiff with a five
clay notice of the defendant's intent to evict the plaintiff and take possession of the prem-
ises under the forcible entry and detainer statute. Id. at 509, 508 N.E.2d at 1054 (citing
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, para. 9-209 (1985)).
149. Id. at 511, 508 N.E.2d at 1055.
150. Id. at 511-12, 508 N.E.2d at 1055 (citing Illinois Merchants Trust Co. v. Har-
vey, 335 I11. 284, 167 N.E. 69 (1929)). In Illinois Merchants, the court held that the
tenant could not recover his payments of the landlord's income taxes under the "volun-
tary-payment doctrine." Illinois Merchants, 335 III. at 296, 167 N.E. at 74. According to
the lessor, the lease required the tenant to make the payments, and the lessor threatened
forfeiture unless payment was made. After the tenant made the payment, the Illinois
Supreme Court ruled in another case that a similar lease provision did not require pay-
ment of income taxes by the lessee. The tenant then filed suit to recover the amounts paid
under protest. Id. at 288, 167 N.E. at 71. The court, however, determined that the ten-
ant could have obtained equitable relief against the threatened forfeiture, and therefore,
the payment by the tenant was voluntary and not made under compulsion or duress. Id.
at 296, 167 N.E. at 74.
151. Kanter, 116 Ill. 2d at 511, 508 N.E.2d at 1055.
152. Id. at 512, 508 N.E.2d at 1056.
153. Id. at 515, 508 N.E.2d at 1057. The court also indicated that the plaintiff would
suffer no irreparable injury because the plaintiff had adequate funds to pay the disputed
rent due, and no evidence was offered to show that the defendant would mishandle the
funds after payment. Id. at 516, 508 N.E.2d at 1057.
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2. Actions under the Lease
In Steven W. Barrick & Associates v. Witz, 5 4 the Appellate Court
of Illinois for the Second District considered whether a lessor's
waiver of a breach during the lease term affected his right to termi-
nate a renewable lease upon expiration of the lease term. 15 In Bar-
rick, the defendant-tenant complained regularly to his neighbors
about noise, and physically threatened several neighbors, a mainte-
nance man, and the building manager. 5 6 Despite the tenant's acts,
the plaintiff-lessor continued to accept the tenant's rent payments.
Subsequently, the lessor sent a termination notice to the tenant,
detailing the reasons for termination of the lease and informing
him that the termination would be effective upon the expiration of
the current lease. 5 7 The court held that by silently accepting the
rent payments following breach of the lease, the lessor waived the
right to terminate the tenancy at the end of the lease term. 58
In ARCO Petroleum Products v. Williams, 5 9 the Illinois Appel-
late Court for the First District considered whether a landlord was
required to comply with the five-day statutory notice provision for
the termination of a lease. In Williams, the lessor had the right
under the lease to terminate immediately the lease for criminal
misconduct by the tenant that related to the operations of the
leased premises. 60 The lessor also had the right to terminate the
lease for nonpayment of rent following at least five days prior writ-
ten notice. '61 On July 11, 1984, the plaintiff-lessor sent the defend-
ant-tenant a letter notifying the defendant that he was in default
with his rent payments and that failure to pay within five days
would constitute a default under the lease. On August 27, 1984,
the plaintiff mailed to the defendant a notice of termination, which
was to be effective August 31, 1984. The letter stated criminal mis-
conduct and nonpayment of rent as reasons for the termination. 62
The court concluded that the lessor properly notified the tenant
154. 147 II1. App. 3d 615, 498 N.E.2d 738 (2d Dist. 1986).
155. Id. at 616, 498 N.E.2d at 740.
156. Id. at 616, 498 N.E.2d at 739.
157. Id.
158. Id. at 620, 498 N.E.2d at 742. The court reasoned that the plaintiff's silent
acceptance of the tenant's breaches led the tenant to believe that strict compliance with
the lease was not required. Id. The case is silent about whether the lease contained a
"non-waiver of rights" clause allowing the lessor to enforce selectively lease terms.
159. 146 II!. App. 3d 218, 496 N.E.2d 1098 (1st Dist. 1986).
160. Id. at 219, 496 N.E.2d at 1099.
161. Id.
162. Id. at 219-20, 496 N.E.2d at 1099. The lessee allegedly had attacked one of the
plaintiff's employees with an ax. Id.
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of the lessor's intent to terminate the lease in compliance with the
lease provisions.'6 3 The court reasoned that because the lease pro-
vision gave the landlord the right to terminate the lease immedi-
ately upon criminal conduct by the tenant, the landlord did not
need to comply with the five-day statutory notice provision. Fur-
thermore, the court concluded that the lessor did not waive the
right to immediately terminate the lease by his letter of August 27,
1984.164
In Bales v. Nelson, 6 the Illinois Appellate Court for the Third
District determined the effect of abandonment on a contract pur-
chaser's subsequetit right to possession. ' 66 In Bales, the plaintiffs,
purchasers under an installment contract, failed to make timely
monthly installments. 67 The plaintiffs allowed the property insur-
ance to lapse, failed to pay two property tax installments, and va-
cated the premises. 68  The court concluded that, when the
plaintiffs vacated the premises, they abandoned the contract. 69
Further, after the plaintiffs abandoned the contract, their right to
possession terminated as a matter of law when the defendants gave
the plaintiffs a thirty-day notice of default and then peaceably took
possession of the property.' 70 Accordingly, the court affirmed the
trial court's conclusion that the defendants took the proper steps to
extinguish any right of possession that the plaintiffs may have had
against the defendant-vendors and the subsequent purchasers of
the property.' 7 '
3. Rescission for Breach of Warranty
The Illinois Appellate Court for the Second District examined a
lessee's appropriate remedy for breach of warranty in Klucznik v.
Nikitopoulos.'72 In Klucznik, the tenants filed suit for breach of
163. Id. at 221, 496 N.E.2d at 1100.
164. Id. The tenant argued that because the letter referred to the five-day provision
for termination in the lease, the lessor waived the right to terminate immediately. The
court, however, determined that the letter concerned termination for non-payment of
rent, which had no effect on the lessor's other rights under the lease. Id.
165. 148 II1. App. 3d 7, 499 N.E.2d 144 (3d Dist. 1986).
166. Id. at 8, 499 N.E.2d at 145.
167. Id.
168. Id. at 8, 499 N.E.2d at I47.
169. Id. at 10, 499 N.E.2d at 146.
170. Id. at 10-11, 499 N.E.2d at 146. The co.;t indicated that, before instituting a
forcible entry and detainer action against a defaultin;g purchaser, a vendor must give
thirty days notice and make a subsequent statutory demand for immediate possession.
Id. (citing Given v. Lofton, 359 Il1. 228, 194 N.E. 512 (1935)).
171. Id. at 11, 499 N.E.2d at 147.
172. 152 Ill. App. 3d 323, 503 N.E.2d 1147 (2d Dist. 1987).
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warranty in a restaurant lease, seeking damages for lost profits and
requesting rescission of the lease.'73 The lessor had warranted ex-
pressly that the heating and cooling systems were in good working
order. The systems, however, failed to work properly from the
time the plaintiffs assumed the lease until nine months later, when
the city closed the restaurant for having insufficient heating. 174
The court refused to grant rescission. 7  The court, however, de-
termined that the lower court's finding that the lease terminated as
of January 1985 was, in effect, a partial rescission. 76 Further, the
court determined that the proper remedy fDr the period prior to the
termination of the lease was money damages for lost profits.' 77
D. Lease Interpretation
Illinois courts addressed a variety of issues concerning lease in-
terpretation during the Survey period. These issues included evalu-
ating the sufficiency of a lease agreement, 78 interpreting undefined
terminology,' 79 and assessing rights and responsibilities under am-
biguous,10 unambiguous,'"' or inarticulate'82 lease provisions.
173. Id. at 325, 503 N.E.2d at 1149.
174. Id. at 326-27, 503 N.E.2d at ! t49. The five-year lease term began on November
1, 1983. The plaintiffs assumed the lease in April, 1984, and the city of Dekalb closed the
restaurant in January, 1985. Id.
175. Id. at 328, 503 N.E.2d at 1151. The court concluded that the tenants had com-
plicated unnecessarily any possible rescission by continuing the lease for seven months
after learning of the heating and cooling systems' malfunctions. Id. at 328, 503 N.E.2d at
1150.
176. Id. at 328, 503 N.E.2d at 1150-51 (termination of the lease "rescinded" the re-
maining term of the lease from January, 1985 to November 1, 1988).
177. Id. at 328-29, 503 N.E.2d at 1150. The court ruled that the parties could not
properly be restored to their status quo ante, and therefore, money damages were suffi-
cient. Id. The court stated that the plaintiff may establish the amount of lost profits by
introducing the amount of profits realized in prior years. Id. at 329, 503 N.E.2d at 1151.
The court also stated that the plaintiff is required to establish a basis for assessing the
amount of lost profits with reasonable certainty, not mathematical accuracy. Id.
178. See infra notes 183-95 and accompanying text.
179. See Anest v. Bellino, 151 II1. App. 3d 818, 503 N.E.2d 576 (2d Dist. 1987). In
an action for an accounting for gross sales of a restaurant, the court determined that the
term "gross sales" under the lease did not include the total amount paid by customers for
lottery tickets, but only the agency fee received by the restaurant for each ticket sold. Id.
at 822, 503 N.E.2d at 579-80.
180. See First Nat'l Bank of Elgin v. G.M.P., Inc., 148 I11. App. 3d 826, 499 N.E.2d
1039 (2d Dist. 1986). In G.M.P., the plaintiffs leased a commercial building to the de-
fendant-lessee under a lease providing that "the lessee at his own expense will keep all
improvements in good repair (injury by fire, or other causes beyond lessee's control ex-
cepted)." Id. at 829, 499 N.E.2d at 1041. Following a fire which started when one of the
lessee's employees was working with flammable chemicals, the lessor sued for rent due
and damages for the loss of the building. Id. at 827-28, 499 N.E.2d at 1040. The court
concluded that the lessee should bear the risk of fire loss because the lessee-drafted lease
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In Ceres Illinois, Inc. v. Illinois Scrap Processing,18 3 the Illinois
Supreme Court evaluated the sufficiency of a lease agreement. 84
In Ceres, the predecessor of the plaintiff, Ceres Illinois, Inc., orally
agreed to lease certain lakefront warehouse property to the defend-
ant, Illinois Scrap Processing, Inc., for fifteen years. 185 Both par-
ties anticipated that the agreement would be reduced to a writing.
In fact, the defendant drafted a letter to the plaintiff's predecessor
that referred to the agreement as "tentative."'' 16 While negotia-
tions for a final written agreement continued, the defendant re-
ceived permission to move scrap onto the premises 87 and to install
a scrap press on the premises. 8 8 The plaintiff subsequently deter-
mined that the defendant's use of the property was detrimental to
the plaintiff's operations on an adjoining parcel and requested the
defendant to discontinue its operation.'8 9 The defendant refused to
vacate the property, and the plaintiff brought suit seeking perma-
nent injunctive relief and money damages.190
The supreme court stated the general rule that a valid lease con-
tract must include an "agreement as to the extent and bounds of
was ambiguous and the lessee had a common law responsibility for his own negligence.
Id. at 830, 499 N.E.2d at 1042.
181. See Meeker-Magner Co. v. Globe Life Ins. Co., 152 Ill. App. 3d 534, 504 N.E.2d
854 (1st Dist. 1987). The court reviewed lease provisions which permitted the lessor to
terminate the tenant's lease and sell the building, and which provided that the lessor
would pay the lessee $100,000 in stipulated damages if the lessor cancelled the lessee's
right to extend the lease term under an option. Id. at 536, 504 N.E.2d at 854. The court
held that these lease provisions were not ambiguous. Id. at 538-39, 504 N.E.2d at 857.
The court also determined that the stipulated damage provision applied only if the lessor
owned the building at the time the lessee tried to exercise its option to extend. Id. at 538,
504 N.E.2d at 856. Hence, the court concluded that the lessor properly terminated the
lease and was not liable for damages. Id. at 538-39, 504 N.E.2d at 857.
182. See Tishman Midwest Management Corp. v. Jarvis, Ltd., 146 Ill. App. 3d 684,
500 N.E.2d 431 (1st Dist. 1986). The plaintiff contended that a paragraph in the lease
required the lessor to credit the plaintiff's rent for any expenses incurred in the pursuit of
a reduction in assessed value. The plaintiff claimed this credit in addition to a credit for
any reduction in taxes which was obtained. Id. at 687, 500 N.E.2d at 433. Although the
court found that the real estate tax clause in the lease was "inarticulate," the lease was
not ambiguous because the rational and probable meaning of the clause allowed the land-
lord to deduct expenses incurred in obtaining tax savings from the total amount of sav-
ings passed on to the tenant. Id. at 690-91, 500 N.E.2d at 435-36.
183. 114 Ill. 2d 133, 500 N.E.2d 1 (1986).
184. Id. at 145, 500 N.E.2d at 6.
185. Id. at 136, 500 N.E.2d at 2. The plaintiff's parent corporation purchased all of
the stock of the plaintiff's predecessor and changed the name of the company to Ceres
Illinois, Inc., the present plaintiff.
186. Id. at 138, 500 N.E.2d at 2.
187. Id.
188. Id. at 139, 500 N.E.2d at 3.
189. Id. at 140, 500 N.E.2d at 3.
190. Id. at 136, 500 N.E.2d at 1.
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the property, the rental price and time and manner of payment,
and the term of the lease."' 9' The court then determined that the
parties did not intend their oral agreement to be binding. 92 Ac-
cordingly, the court held that a binding fifteen-year lease did not
exist.1 93 The court, however, found that an oral agreement for an
indefinite term existed which the plaintiff could properly termi-
nate. 94 The court, therefore, concluded that the plaintiff properly
terminated the oral agreement within its contractual rights. 9 5
V. ZONING
During the Survey period,"'9 Illinois appellate courts addressed
191. Id. at 145, 500 N.E.2d at 6 (citing Bournique v. Williams, 225 Ill. App. 12, 20-
21 (1st Dist. 1922)).
192. Id. The court noted that the defendant's asking permission to enter the property
indicated that the parties contemplated something less than an enforceable leasehold in-
terest. Further, the plaintiffs clearly indicated in correspondence that a subsequent writ-
ten lease would supercede any prior negotiations. Id. at 145-46, 500 N.E.2d at 6.
193. Id. at 147, 500 N.E.2d at 6.
194. Id. at 147, 500 N.E.2d at 7.
195. Id.
196. The United States Supreme Court recently decided two cases involving zoning
and land use. In First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County of
Los Angeles, 107 S. Ct. 2387 (1987), the Court considered whether the Just Compensa-
tion clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution required the gov-
ernment to pay for a temporary regulatory taking. Id. at 2385. In First English, the
defendant passed an interim ordinance that prevented the plaintiff from rebuilding a
campground that had been destroyed by a flood. Id. at 2381-82. The Court held that
temporary takings which restrain the landowner from all use of his property are essen-
tially equivalent to permanent takings and, therefore, require compensation. Id. at 2388.
Further, the court stated that this compensation should include the fair value of the regu-
lated property right for the entire period of regulation. Id. at 2389.
In Nollan v. California Coastal Commission, 107 S. Ct. 3141 (1987), the defendant
demanded that the plaintiff grant an easement for a public walkway across plaintiff's
beachfront property in return for a building permit to tear down and replace an existing
structure on the property. Id. at 3143. The Court held that the defendant's demand was
an unconstitutional taking of property in violation of the Fifth Amendment to the United
States Constitution. Id. at 3148. The Court reasoned that the demand for an easement
lacked the "essential nexus" to the request for a building permit which would justify the
complete denial of the permit. Id. The Nollan decision raised a question about the au-
thority of the government to mandate the property rights of private parties in return for
public approvals.
After the close of the Survey period, the Illinois Appellate Court for the Second Dis-
trict decided a notable case concerning the standing of one municipality, the Village of
Riverwoods, to challenge an ordinance of another municipality, the Village of Buffalo
Grove. Village of Riverwoods v. Village of Buffalo Grove, 159 Ill. App. 3d 208, 511
N.E.2d 184 (2d Dist. 1987). Riverwoods challenged a Buffalo Grove ordinance that ap-
proved a planned unit development in an area of Buffalo Grove that was separated from
Riverwoods by approximately sixteen hundred feet of forest preserve property and a
river. Id. at 210, 511 N.E.2d at 185. Evidence showed that the proposed development
would increase traffic in Riverwoods and would also increase that village's expenses for
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several zoning issues including the construction of a zoning ordi-
nance, 197 and the validity of zoning ordinances. 19  The courts ad-
dressed also some specific constitutional aspects of zoning
ordinances. 99
A. Generally
In City of Pekin v. Kaminski,2°° the Illinois Appellate Court for
the Second District addressed the issue of the proper construction
of a zoning ordinance.20 ' In Kaminski, the defendant, who was in
the insurance business, included his home address and telephone
number in a yellow pages advertisement. He also advertised his
home telephone number in a commercial on cable television.20 2
The city contended that the defendant's failure to obtain a home
occupation permit to conduct business in his home violated a city
ordinance requiring such a permit.20 3 The court held that the de-
fendant's advertisements did not violate a local zoning ordinance
requiring home occupation permits for offices at home.2°4 In so
ruling, the court stated that zoning laws detract from the common
law right to use property, and are, therefore, strictly construed in
favor of the right of the property owner to enjoy the unrestricted
use of his property. 20 5 Finally, the court noted that the purpose of
the ordinance was to protect the character of the residential neigh-
borhood. The court then concluded that the defendant's advertise-
ments did nothing to impinge on this purpose. °
The Illinois Appellate Court for the Third District evaluated the
validity of a zoning ordinance in National Bank of Joliet v. County
police protection and road maintenance. The court, however, held that Riverwoods
lacked standing to challenge the approval of a planned unit development within the cor-
porate limits of Buffalo Grove. Id. at 212, 511 N.E.2d at 186. The court reasoned that
Riverwoods offered generalized and speculative evidence about the effects of the develop-
ment, which failed to show a sufficiently substantial adverse effect upon the performance
of its municipal corporate obligations. Id.
197. See infra notes 200-06 and accompanying text.
198. See infra notes 207-12 and accompanying text.
199. See infra notes 213-40 and accompanying text.
200. 155 Ill. App. 3d 826, 508 N.E.2d 776 (3d Dist. 1987).
201. Id. at 831, 508 N.E.2d at 779.
202. Id. at 827, 508 N.E.2d at 777.
203. Id.
204. Id. at 831, 508 N.E.2d at 779.
205. Id. at 830, 508 N.E.2d at 779 (citing City of Rockford v. Eisenstein, 63 111. App.
2d 128, 211 N.E.2d 130 (2d Dist. 1965)). Cf. Knor v. County of Madison, 151 Ill. App.
3d 767, 774, 502 N.E.2d 1063, 1068 (5th Dist. 1986) (zoning is a proper exercise of the
police power of the state, and in construing a zoning ordinance, effect should be given to
the drafters' intention.)
206. Kaminski, 155 Il1. App. 3d at 830, 508 N.E.2d at 779.
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of Will. 207 In National Bank of Joliet, a change in a county zoning
ordinance prohibited further residential development of a subdivi-
sion. Development of the subdivision had been started under a
previous zoning classification that allowed residential develop-
ment.208 The court considered eight factors articulated in earlier
cases to assess the validity of the zoning ordinance. 20 9 The court
held that six of the factors 210 favored the plaintiff's argument and
that the two remaining factors2"1 favored neither the plaintiff nor
the defendant. The court concluded that the plaintiffs established
by clear and convincing evidence that the ordinance was arbitrary,
unreasonable, and bore no substantial relation to the health, safety,
and welfare of the public.2 2
B. Constitutional Decisions
Illinois appellate courts addressed several zoning cases that in-
volved constitutional issues during the Survey year. The matters
addressed include an unconstitutionally vague zoning ordinance,21 3
207. 151 I11. App. 3d 957, 503 N.E.2d 842 (3d Dist. 1987).
208. Id. at 959, 503 N.E.2d at 843.
209. Id. at 960, 503 N.E.2d at 846-48. The eight factors that measure the validity of
a zoning ordinance are as follows:
(1) the existing uses and zoning of nearby property; (2) the extent to which
property values are diminished by the particular zoning restrictions; (3) the ex-
tent to which the destruction of property values of plaintiff promotes the health,
safety, morals or general welfare of the public; (4) the relative gain to the public
as opposed to the hardship imposed upon the individual property owner; (5) the
suitability of the subject property for the zoned purposes; . . . (6) the length of
time the property has been vacant as zoned considered in the context of land
development in the area in the vicinity of the subject property[;] ... (7) the care
with which the community has undertaken to plan its land use development;
and (8) the evidence or lack of evidence of community need for the use pro-
posed by the plaintiff.
Id. at 960, 503 N.E.2d at 844 (citing LaSalle Nat'l Bank v. County of Cook, 12 I11. 2d 40,
145 N.E.2d 65 (1957); Sinclair Pipe Line Co. v. Village of Richton Park, 19 Ill. 2d 370,
167 N.E.2d 406 (1960)).
210. Id. at 963-66, 503 N.E.2d at 846-48. Factors (1), (2), (3), (4), (5), and (8) favor
the plaintiff. See supra note 209.
211. Nat'l Bank of Joliet, 151 III. App. 3d at 965, 503 N.E.2d at 847-48. Factors (6)
and (7) favor neither party. See supra note 209.
212. Nat'l Bank of Joliet, 151 I11. App. 3d at 966, 503 N.E.2d at 848. Cf. Family
Christian Fellowship v. County of Winnebago, 151 I11. App. 3d 616, 503 N.E.2d 367 (2d
Dist. 1986). In Family Christian Fellowship, the court applied six factors enunciated in
LaSalle Nat'l Bank v. County of Cook, 12 I1l. 2d 40, 145 N.E.2d 65 (1957), to determine
the validity of a zoning decision. The court concluded that the defendant's denial of
plaintiff's proposed church/school use was arbitrary and unreasonable, and bore no sub-
stantial relation to the public health, safety, and welfare. Family Christian Fellowship,
151 Iii. App. 3d at 619, 503 N.E.2d at 373.
213. See infra notes 216-22 and accompanying text.
674 Loyola University Law Journal [Vol. 19
a "content neutral" zoning ordinance that restricted the locations
of uses protected by the first amendment, 14 and constitutional no-
tice requirements for an effective rezoning.215
In Union National Bank & Trust v. Village of New Lenox,21 6 the
plaintiffs requested a special use permit from the defendant village
under the village zoning ordinance for land that was zoned for lim-
ited industrial use. After the village denied the request, the plain-
tiffs filed an action for injunctive relief, alleging that the zoning
ordinance established unconstitutionally vague zoning classifica-
tions.217 The court applied the general rule that an ordinance is
unconstitutionally vague when persons of common intelligence
214. See infra notes 223-34 and accompanying text.
215. See infra notes 235-40 and accompanying text.
216. 152 Ill. App. 3d 919, 505 N.E.2d I (3d Dist. 1987), reh'g denied, Apr. 3, 1987.
217. Id. at 920, 505 N.E.2d at 2. Under the pertinent section on "Limited Industrial
Districts," the ordinance provided as follows:
USES PERMITTED: No land shall be used ... for other than one or more of
the following specified uses:
A. Industrial type uses, such as but not limited to:
1. All manufacturing and industrial activities, including fabrication,
processing, assembly, disassembly, repairing, cleaning, servicing, test-
ing, packaging and storage of materials, products and goods that can
be conducted wholly within enclosed buildings.
2. Laboratories and research firms...
3. Printing, publishing or lithography establishments.
4. Railroad freight yards.
SPECIAL USES PERMITTED: The following uses shall be permitted only if
specifically authorized by the Zoning Board of Appeals... :
A. Similar and compatible uses to those allowed as permitted uses in this
district.
B. Drive-in banking facilities.
C. Planned unit development.
D. Residence of the proprietor, caretaker or watchman, when located on the
premises of the commercial or industrial use.
E. Radio and television towers.
F. Filling of holes, pits or lowlands with non-combustible material free from
refuse and/or food wastes.
G. Mining, loading and hauling of sand, gravel, topsoil or other aggregate or
minerals....
PROHIBITED USES: All uses not expressly authorized [as Uses Permitted or
Special Uses Permitted], including but not limited to:
A. Residential uses, except as a special use.
B. Drive-in restaurants.
C. Wrecking, dismantling or automotive salvage yard.
Id. at 921-22, 505 N.E.2d at 2-3 (quoting Village of New Lennox, Ill., Ordinance 10-6-2).
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necessarily must guess at its meaning. 2 8 Based on this standard,
the court concluded that the ordinance was unconstitutionally
vague.219 The court noted that the ordinance described possible
"permitted uses" and "prohibited uses," but failed to provide spe-
cific standards to determine the appropriate category for a non-
listed proposed use.220 In addition, the ordinance defined the "spe-
cial uses" category as those uses similar to, and compatible with,
"permitted uses." This further confused the catagories. 22' The
court, therefore, rejected the ordinance because it failed to deline-
ate adequately the characteristics of the various zoning
classifications.222
In Zebulon Enterprises v. County of DuPage,223 the Illinois Ap-
pellate Court for the Second District examined an ordinance that
restricted "recreation and amusement establishments," which in-
cluded adult book and video stores, 224 to control traffic and park-
ing.22  The plaintiff, who operated an adult book and video store,
raised two constitutional challenges to the ordinance. First, the
plaintiff contended that a zoning ordinance that required a special
use permit for adult book and video stores unconstitutionally re-
stricted the plaintiff's freedom of speech under the first amend-
ment.226 Second, the plaintiff argued that the ordinance violated
the first amendment because it lacked appropriate standards to
guide the county board in deciding whether to grant a special use
permit.227
The court rejected the plaintiff's contention that the zoning ordi-
nance unconstitutionally restricted the plaintiff's freedom of
speech. 228 The court stated that a "content neutral" zoning ordi-
218. Id. at 922, 505 N.E.2d at 3 (citing Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601 (1973);
Redemske v. Village of Romeoville, 35 Ill. App. 3d 286, 406 N.E.2d 602 (3d Dist. 1980)).
219. Union Nat'! Bank, 152 11. App. 3d at 922, 505 N.E.2d at 3.
220. Id.
221. Id.
222. Id. at 922-23, 505 N.E.2d at 3. The court indicated that the ordinance was also
unconstitutionally vague because the lack of definite standards for determining zoning
classifications improperly vested administrative officials, the village board of trustees,
with discretionary powers to determine applicable standards. Id. The court ruled that
such a practice was an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power. Id. at 923, 505
N.E.2d at 4.
223. 146 Ill. App. 3d 515, 496 N.E.2d 1256 (2d Dist. 1986).
224. Id. at 518, 496 N.E.2d at 1258.
225. Id. at 521, 496 N.E.2d at 1260.
226. Id. at 520, 496 N.E.2d at 1260. The first amendment to the United States Con-
stitution provides that "Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of
speech." U.S. CONST. amend. I.
227. Zebulon Enterprises, 146 I1. App. 3d at 522, 496 N.E.2d at 1261.
228. Id. at 521, 496 N.E.2d at 1260.
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nance that restricts the locations of uses protected by the first
amendment may be constitutional. 229 The plaintiff conceded that
the ordinance was "content-neutral. ' 230 The court then reasoned
that the county had a substantial governmental interest because the
ordinance restricted recreation and amusement establishments, in-
cluding the plaintiff's store, for the purpose of controlling traffic
and parking.23'
The court, however, agreed with Zebulon that the ordinance vio-
lated the first amendment because it lacked sufficiently narrow, ob-
jective, and definite standards to guide the county board in
deciding whether to allow the special use.232 The court stated that
such standards are required to guide the decisions of legislative
bodies, as well as administrative agencies, if restrictions on first
amendment freedoms are involved.233 The court concluded that
the ordinance lacked the appropriate standards to guide the board
and, therefore, could not be applied against the plaintiff.234
The third zoning case involving constitutional issues, Wells v.
Village of Libertyville,231 addressed the due process requirements
for notice of rezoning. 236 In addition to complying with the statu-
tory notice requirement of publication in a local newspaper, the
defendant-village customarily provided personal notice to all adja-
cent property owners. 37 In the present case, the village published
a notice of a public hearing on the ordinance amendment proceed-
ings in a local newspaper. The village, however, failed to send per-
sonal notices to the plaintiffs regarding the hearing.238 The court
reasoned that the failure to personally notify the plaintiffs by mail
did not deprive the plaintiffs of due process, because the village
properly published notice in a local newspaper.239 The court,
229. Id. A "content neutral" zoning ordinance that restricts the locations of uses
protected by the first amendment is constitutional if it is "narrowly designed to serve a
substantial government interest, and ... the restrictions do not unreasonably limit alter-
native avenues of communication." Id. at 521, 496 N.E.2d at 1260 (citing City of Renton
v. Playtime Theatres, 106 S. Ct. 925 (1986)).
230. Id.
23 1. Id. The plaintiff also failed to show that the ordinance unreasonably restricted
alternative avenues of communication. Id.
232. Id. at 522, 496 N.E.2d at 1261.
233. Id. at 523, 496 N.E.2d at 1261.
234. Id.
235. 153 Ill. App. 3d 361, 505 N.E.2d 740 (2d Dist. 1987).
236. Id. at 367, 505 N.E.2d at 744.
237. Id. at 363, 505 N.E.2d at 741.
238. Id.
239. Id. at 367, 505 N.E.2d at 744 (citing Bohan v. Village of Riverside, 9 IM. 2d 561,
138 N.E.2d 487 (1956)).
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therefore, concluded that the village's long-standing custom of pro-
viding personal notice did not create a "self-imposed, legally bind-
ing obligation." 24
VI. TRANSFERS OF INTERESTS IN PROPERTY
A. Self-made "Land Patent" to Create Superior Title
In Britt v. Federal Land Bank Association,24' the Illinois Appel-
late for the Second District considered the legal significance of a
"land patent" made by a former owner after an entry of a judg-
ment of foreclosure against the property.242 In Britt, the plaintiffs,
former owners of the subject property, filed documents labeled
"Land Patents ' 243 in the county recorder's office. 2 " These docu-
ments purported to convey title to the plaintiffs which was superior
to any other title.245 The plaintiffs then instituted the present ac-
tion seeking to quiet title to the property.246 This issue was one of
first impression in Illinois, and therefore, the court looked to other
jurisdictions for guidance.247 The court concluded that the "pat-
ent" involved was not a government grant. Rather, the court de-
termined that the "patent" was a self-serving, gratuitous grant by
the plaintiffs to themselves. 248 The court stated that such "land
patents" create no rights in the former owner.249 The court con-
cluded that such a grant "does not, cannot and will not be sufficient
by itself to create good title."' 250 Moreover, the court determined
that such land patents are "frivolous and without basis and should
not be raised in the circuit courts of [Illinois]."'251 The court, there-
fore, vigorously affirmed the dismissal of this case.252
240. Id. at 369, 505 N.E.2d at 746.
241. 153 Ill. App. 3d 605, 505 N.E.2d 387 (2d Dist. 1987).
242. Id. at 607, 505 N.E.2d at 388.
243. A land patent is "the deed by which the government passes fee simple title of
government land to private persons." Id. at 613, 505 N.E.2d at 392.
244. Id. at 607, 505 N.E.2d at 388.
245. Id.
246. Id.
247. Id. at 609, 505 N.E.2d at 390.
248. Id.
249. Id. at 613, 505 N.E.2d at 392.
250. Id. at 610, 505 N.E.2d at 390 (quoting Hilgeford v. Peoples Bank, 607 F. Supp.
536 (N.D. Ind. 1985), aff'd, 776 F.2d 176 (7th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 1644
(1986) (emphasis in original)).
251. Id. at 614, 505 N.E.2d at 393.
252. Id. at 614-15, 505 N.E.2d at 393-94. Before affirming the lower court's dismissal
of the plaintiff's case with prejudice, the court indicated that such suits were frivolous
and that a party filing such a suit could be subject to sanctions under Rule 11 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Id. (citing FED. R. Civ. P. 11).
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VII. THE ILLINOIS MORTGAGE FORECLOSURE LAW
In an attempt to clarify existing Illinois mortgage foreclosure
law, the Illinois legislature recently enacted the Illinois Mortgage
Foreclosure Law (the "IMFL" or the "Act") 25 3 which became ef-
fective July 1, 1987. This section will give a brief overview of the
important aspects of the IMFL and a summary of the changes that
the IMFL made to existing law.25 4
A. Structure of the Act
Prior to the enactment of the IMFL, mortgage foreclosure law
was developed in various statutes and case law. The Act codified
the previous statutes and case law, with certain changes mentioned
below, into a unified statutory scheme. Under the new scheme, the
IMFL contains seven main parts: General Provisions, 255 Defini-
tions, 256 Mortgage Lien Priorities, 257 Methods of Terminating
Mortgagor's Interest in Real Estate,258 Judicial Foreclosure Proce-
dure,259 Reinstatement and Redemption 260 and Possession During
Foreclosure.26'
B. Major Aspects of the Act
1. Instruments Covered by the Act
The IMFL sets forth the exclusive procedure for the foreclosure
of mortgages, 262 certain installment contracts263 for residential real
253. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, para. 15-1101 to 15-1706 (Supp. 1987). The Illinois
legislature passed a Technical Corrections Act amending certain provisions of the IMFL.
P.A. 85-907, 1987 Il1. Legis. Serv. 127-52 (West) (effective Nov. 23, 1987).
254. For a more in-depth review of the IMFL, see Liss, Introduction to the Proposed
Illinois Mortgage Foreclosure Act, 9 ILL. FUND CONCEPT 13 (May, 1985) and Note, The
Illinois Mortgage Foreclosure Law and Installment Sales Contracts 19 Loy. U. Ci. L.J.
245 (1987).
255. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, para. 15-1101 to -1107 (1987).
256. Id. at para. 15-1201 to -1222.
257. Id. at para. 15-1301 to -1302.
258. Id. at para. 15-1401 to -1405.
259. Id. at para. 15-1501 to -1512.
260. Id. at para. 15-1601 to -1605.
261. Id. at para. 15-1701 to -1706.
262. Id. at para. 15-1 10ob(a)(1). The Act defines "mortgage" as "any consensual lien
created by a written instrument which grants or retains an interest in real estate to secure
a debt or other obligation." Id. at para. 15-1207. Further, the term "mortgage" includes
mortgages securing "reverse mortgage" loans, mortgages securing "revolving credit"
loans, equitable mortgages and every deed conveying real estate which, although absolute
in its terms, was intended only as a security. Id.
263. Id. at para. 15-1106(a)(2) (1987). Installment contracts are subject to the provi-
sions of the Act if the purchase price is payable in installments over a period longer than
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estate entered into on or after July 1, 1987, and certain collateral
assignments of a beneficial interest in a land trust 64 made on or
after July 1, 1987.265 The Act expanded the category of instru-
ments covered by Illinois' statutory mortgage law to include these
latter two types of instruments. Prior statutory law covered only
mortgages, trust deeds, and other conveyances in the nature of
mortgages.266
In addition to those instruments required to be foreclosed under
the IMFL, certain other instruments may be foreclosed under the
Act. For example, a secured party under the Uniform Commercial
Code267 may invoke the IMFL to enforce a security interest in
property, if the interest was created on or after July 1, 1987 by a
collateral assignment of a beneficial interest in a land trust or by an
assignment for security of a buyer's interest in a real estate install-
ment contract. 26  Further, a contract seller may elect to foreclose
under the IMFL those real estate installment contracts entered
into on or after July 1, 1987 for which the IMFL is not the exclu-
sive foreclosure procedure. 69
2. Necessary Parties
Under the Act, the category of "necessary parties" required to
be joined as defendants in a foreclosure suit includes only the mort-
gagor 270 and certain other persons271 who are indebted or have
other obligations secured by the mortgage and against whom the
five years, and if less than eighty percent of the original purchase price remains unpaid at
the time the foreclosure complaint is filed. Id.
264. Id. at para. 15-1106(a)(3). The IMFL precludes a lender from relying on the
sale remedies of the Uniform Commercial Code in certain situations when a land trust
was formed to circumvent the procedures of the IMFL. Thus, the collateral assignment
of a beneficial interest ["ABI"] in a land trust must be foreclosed under the Act if the
assignment is made contemporaneously with the creation of the land trust, is required by
the holder of the obligation as security for payment, and is evidenced by a writing that
permits the underlying real estate to be sold to satisfy the obligation. Id. Although the
IMFL statutorily recognized this treatment of a collateral ABI for the first time, Illinois
case law previously required the same treatment. See, e.g., Homey v. Hayes, 11 Il1. 2d
178, 142 N.E.2d 94 (1957); DeVoigne v. Chicago Title and Trust Co., 304 Il1. 177, 136
N.E. 498 (1922).
265. See S. Lindberg & W. Bender, The Illinois Mortgage Foreclosure Law, 76 ILL.
B.J. 800-02 (Oct. 1987) (discussing the interests to be foreclosed under the Act).
266. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, para. 15-101 (1985) (repealed 1987).
267. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 26, para. 9-101 to 9-507 (1985) (repealed 1987).
268. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, para. 15-1106(b) (1987).
269. Id. at para. 15-1106(c) (e.g., a real estate contract for non-residential real estate).
270. "Mortgagor" means the person wh'nse interest in the real estate is the subject of
the mortgage and any person claiming through a mortgagor as successor. ILL. REV.
STAT. ch. 110, para. 15-1209. Also, when a mortgage is executed by a trustee of a land
trust, the mortgagor is the trustee and not the beneficiary of the land trust. P.A. 85-907,
19s88 679
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mortgagee asserts personal liability. 2  Prior law required the iden-
tification of, and service upon, all "necessary and indispensable"
parties.273 This required the joinder of parties with less substantial
interests in the property, such as junior lienholders, and often led
to considerable delay.274
In response to this problem, the IMFL promotes efficiency by
allowing the foreclosure to proceed without unduly burdensome
notice and joinder requirements.2 75 At the same time, the IMFL
protects the interests of non-joined parties, termed "permissible
parties, 2 76 by permitting joinder of any party with an interest in
the property, and by providing that any disposition of the mort-
gaged real estate is subject to the interests of such non-joined
parties.277
Another new aspect of the IMFL involves cases in which the
mortgagee may join the State of Illinois as a defendant. The State
may be joined if the foreclosure involves real estate upon which the
State or any political subdivision of the State has an interest or
claim for lien.27 8 Previously, the State was not a proper party de-
fendant to the foreclosure action. Rather, following a judgment of
foreclosure, the mortgagee was required to serve the State with a
copy of the certificate of sale and foreclose the State's right to re-
deem under a separate procedure.279
3. Methods of Terminating Mortgagor's Interest in Real Estate
The IMFL specifies four methods for terminating a mortgagor's
1987 Ill. Legis. Serv. 133 (West) (to be codified at Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 110, para. 15-
1209(ii)).
271. "Other persons" does not include guarantors. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, para.
15-1501(a) (1987).
272. Id. Any disposition of the real estate, however, shall be subject to the interests
of all other persons not made a party to the action. Id.
273. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, para. 2-405(a) (1985).
274. Liss, supra note 254, at 15.
275. I1. Rev. Stat. ch. 110, para. 15-1501 to -1503 (1987).
276. Id. at para. 15-1501(b).
277. Id. at para. 15-1501(a).
278. Id. at ch. 110, para. 15-1501(b)(6). The Act, as amended, clarified the proce-
dure for serving the State of Illinois. The Act requires that a copy of both the summons
and the complaint be sent to the Attorney General. P.A. 85-907, 1987 11. Legis. Serv.
136 (West) (to be codified at ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, para. 15-1501(g)).
279. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, para. 12-401 (1985) (repealed 1987). The mortgagee
was required to serve the State's Attorney of the county where the property was located
and to obtain an endorsement of the certificate of sale. Then, the mortgagee filed the
endorsed certificate with the recorder of deeds of that county. The State's right to redeem
terminated between sixty days and twelve months after such filing, depending on the
method of foreclosure used. Id.
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interest in real estate: deed in lieu of foreclosure,8 0 consent fore-
closure,28' common law strict foreclosure,8 2 and judicial foreclo-
sure. 2 83 The Act expressly provides that foreclosure sales under
any power of sale clause in a mortgage will not be allowed.28 4
The IMFL provides the first statutory recognition of the right to
terminate a mortgagor's interest by a deed in lieu of foreclosure. 28 5
Under this section, the mortgagee may accept from the mortgagor
a deed in lieu of foreclosure. This acceptance relieves all parties
who may owe payment or performance on the mortgage from per-
sonal liability.28 6 A complete release may be avoided if a person
agrees in a contemporaneously executed instrument to remain per-
sonally liable for existing claims or liens affecting the real estate. 28 7
The second method of termination available to the mortgagee is
the consent foreclosure. 88 In a consent foreclosure, the mortgagee
offers to waive any and all rights to a personal judgment for defi-
ciency against the mortgagor and against all other persons liable
for the indebtedness.289 In turn, the mortgagor expressly consents
to the entry of a judgment satisfying the mortgage indebtedness.
This consent judgment vests absolute title to the real estate in the
mortgagee, free and clear of all claims, liens, and interests of the
280. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, para. 15-1401 (1987) (mortgagee may accept from the
mortgagor a deed in lieu of foreclosure subject to any other claims or liens affecting the
real estate).
281. Id. at para. 15-1402 (available when the mortgagee offers to waive any and all
rights to a personal judgment for deficiency against the mortgagor and when the mortga-
gor expressly consents to the entry of a judgment satisfying the mortgage indebtedness by
vesting absolute title to the mortgaged real estate in the mortgagee free and clear of all
claims, liens and interests of the mortgagor).
282. Id. at para. 15-1403 (the mortgagee's right to foreclose by common law strict
foreclosure is recognized statutorily for the first time and is preserved in the form which
existed as of the effective date of the IMFL).
283. Id. at para. 15-1404 (interest of all persons made party to the foreclosure and
interests of all non-record claimants given notice shall be terminated by the judicial sale,
provided such sale is confirmed or unless otherwise specified in the judgment of foreclo-
sure). See also Liss, supra note 254, at 14 (judicial foreclosure intended to be the "main
method" by which a mortgagor's interest is foreclosed).
284. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, para. 15-1405 (1987) (all such mortgages may be fore-
closed only under the IMFL). After receiving and considering many suggestions to allow
the enforcement of power of sale clauses, the drafters of the IMFL concluded that the
power was too drastic a change from prior law and unnecessary given other provisions of
the Act. Liss, supra note 254, at 14.
285. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, para. 15-1401 (1987).
286. Id. (this provision includes guarantors).
287. Id.
288. Id. at para. 15-1402. The IMFL expressly recognized that certain liens of the
United States cannot be foreclosed without a judicial sale. Id. at para. 15-1402(a). See
also 28 U.S.C. § 2410(c) (Supp. 1985).
289. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, para. 15-1402(a)(1) (1987).
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mortgagor.29 °
Third, the IMFL provides the first statutory recognition of the
mortgagee's right to strict foreclosure. 29' Formerly, this right ex-
isted only under Illinois common law.292 The Act preserves the
mortgagee's right to strict foreclosure in the form which existed in
Illinois as of the effective date of the IMFL.293
The fourth method of termination under the IMFL is the judi-
cial foreclosure.2 94 In a judicial foreclosure, the property subject to
the judgment shall be sold at a judicial sale. The sale occurs after
the entry of a judgment of foreclosure,295 the expiration of the re-
demption period,2 96 and the provision of public notice.297 The judi-
cial sale shall terminate the interests of parties to the foreclosure
and the interests of all non-record claimants given notice, provided
such sale is confirmed by the court.298
Finally, the IMFL expressly prohibits foreclosure sales under
any power of sale clause. 299 This prohibition reflects the drafters'
intent to provide a comprehensive and exclusive system for the
foreclosure of mortgages.300 Thus, the Act requires foreclosures to
proceed under the IMFL, rather than under a private right.
290. Id. at para. 15-1402(a)(3). Under prior law, junior lienholders had three months
after the entry of a consent foreclosure judgment to redeem the property. ILL. REV.
STAT. ch. 110, para. 12-127 (1985) (repealed 1987). The IMFL, however, eliminates this
redemption period, and requires a junior lienholder to file an objection to the consent
foreclosure prior to judgment. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, para. 15-1402(b) (1987). If such
an objection is filed, the junior lienholder receives thirty days to pay the full amount owed
to the foreclosing mortgagee. Id. at para. 15-1402(b)(3). On the other hand, if the junior
lienholder fails to file such an objection, the consent judgment will be entered and abso-
lute title to the mortgaged real estate will vest in the mortgagee, free and clear of the
junior lienholder's interest. Id. at para. 15-1402(a).
291. Id. at para. 15-1403 (1987).
292. See, e.g., Great Lakes Mortgage Corp. v. Collymore, 14 Ill. App. 3d 68, 71, 302
N.E.2d 248, 250 (1st Dist. 1973) (the common law remedy of strict foreclosure was avail-
able upon proof that the mortgagor or owner of the equity of redemption was insolvent;
that the value of the property was less than the mortgage indebtedness and taxes on the
property; and that the mortgagee accepted title to the property in extinction of the mort-
gage indebtedness, i.e., that he gave up the right to a deficiency judgment against the
mortgagor).
293. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, para. 15-1403 (1987).
294. Id. at para. 15-1404. See also, infra notes 301-21 and accompanying text. The
judicial foreclosure is intended to be the primary method by which a mortgagor's interest
is foreclosed. Liss, supra note 254, at 14.
295. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, para. 15-1507(a) (1987).
296. Id. at para. 15-1507(b).
297. Id. at para. 15-1507(c).
298. Id. at para. 15-1404.
299. Id. at para. 15-1405.
300. See, generally, Liss, supra note 254.
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4. New Foreclosure Sale Procedure
The procedural requirements of a judicial foreclosure sale under
the IMFL are both comprehensive and flexible. The IMFL is com-
prehensive in that the Act describes the requirements of the entire
foreclosure process from start to finish in great detail.30 1 Neverthe-
less, the section is flexible in that the judge presiding over the fore-
closure sale may modify or bypass certain statutory provisions.30 2
The section relating to the judicial foreclosure sale provides that
the property shall be sold after the redemption period has run.3 °3
This provision represents the major change in the judicial sale pro-
cedure from prior law. Previously, a defendant could redeem the
real estate sold at a judicial sale for up to six months following tne
sale.3° Under the IMFL, the sale is deferred until after the re-
demption period has expired.10 5
This change in the timing of the foreclosure sale reflects the
drafters' intent to maximize the amount of money received at the
sale by encouraging many bids at "near-market" prices. 3°0 Under
prior law, mortgagees typically purchased the foreclosed property
at the foreclosure sale by bidding the amount of the judgment
debt.307 In light of the mortgagor's subsequent rights of redemp-
tion, other potential bidders saw the purchase of real estate at a
foreclosure sale as a risky investment that did not justify a bid at
fair market value. The mortgagor's right to possession of the prop-
301. See, e.g., ILL. R.V. STAT. ch. 110, para. 15-1504 (1987) (clarifying the required
form, content, and meaning of the complaint, including a requirement that the complaint
set forth a separately itemized statement of the unpaid principal, interest and other
charges, the total amount due, and also the per diem interest accruing under the
mortgage).
302. See, e.g., id. at para. 15-1501(e)(2)-(3) (permitting persons to intervene); id. at
para. 15-1506(f)(14) (special matters included in the judgment as approved by the court);
id. at para. 15-1506(h) (postponement of proving priority); id. at para. 15-1507(b) (sale
pursuant to terms and conditions as specified by the court); id. at para. 15-1507(c)(1)(1)
(information to be included in Notice of Sale); id. at para. 15-1507(c)(2)(ii) (required
publications of Notice of Sale); id. at para. 15-1507(d) (division of property for sale); id.
at para. 15-1512(d) (application of surplus sale proceeds).
303. Id. at para. 15-1507(b). The section provides that upon entry of a judgment of
foreclosure and the expiration of the redemption period, the property "shall be sold at a
sale.., on such terms and conditions as shall be specified by the court in the judgment of
foreclosure." Id.
304. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, para. 12-128 (1985). See also H. Seigan & I. Helfgot, A
Guide to Mortgage Foreclosures, 65 CHi. B. REC. 8, 16 (1983).
305. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, para. 15-1507(b) (1987). But see ILL. REV. STAT. ch.
110, para. 15-1604(a) (1987) (if the price paid for residential real estate at the foreclosure
sale is less than the judgment amount and the mortgagee is the purchaser, then the mort-
gagor has a special right to redeem for thirty days after confirmation of the sale).
306. Liss, supra note 254, at 14.
307. Id.
1988]
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erty during the redemption period was considered especially risky.
For example, a disgruntled mortgagor who had no funds with
which to redeem could damage the property while he was in pos-
session. Moreover, the mortgagor's subsequent right of redemp-
tion clouded the purchaser's prospects of eventually obtaining
clear title to the property, further reducing potential bids.108
Under the IMFL, which places the foreclosure sale after the re-
demption period, prospective purchasers have an opportunity to
obtain clear title and an immediate right to possession with a win-
ning bid at the foreclosure sale.309 At the same time, the mortga-
gor's right to redeem has been preserved.310 Moreover, both the
mortgagor and the mortgagee benefit by a sale price that reflects
fair market value. 31 ' The mortgagor has a chance to receive a por-
tion of any equity developed over the term of the mortgage. At the
same time, the mortgagee receives the amounts due under the
mortgage without having to repossess and then sell the property.
Moreover, holding the sale after the redemption period has run
minimizes the foreclosure sale purchaser's risk of damage to the
property during the redemption period.
The IMFL has added flexibility in the structuring of the judg-
ment order to allow the court and the parties to reach a speedy and
efficient resolution to the sale process.312 For example, the judg-
ment order can provide for a manner of sale other than public auc-
tion,31 3 for an exclusive or a non-exclusive broker listing of the
property, 1 4 or for other specific procedures or terms of the sale. 15
Further, the Act allows the parties to agree in writing on a satisfac-
tory minimum price at which the real estate may be sold to the first
person to offer such a price. 1 6 Moreover, the Act allows the par-
ties to defer proving the priority of an interest in the proceeds of
the sale until after the confirmation of the sale.31 7 This provision
308. In effect, a purchaser was required to put up money for six months with no
guarantee of a completed sale. Thus, bidders further discounted their bids to reflect the
potential loss of the time value of the investment upon redemption.
309. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, para. 15-1701(c)(1) (1987).
310. Id. at paras. 15-1604 and 15-1605.
311. Although the Act encourages sale prices at or near market value, deficiencies
can result. Id. at para. 15-1511. The IMFL provides that, except as expressly prohibited
by* the Act, foreclosure of a mortgage does not affect a mortgagee's rights, if any, to
obtain a personal judgment against any person for a deficiency. Id.
312. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, para. 15-1506(f) (1987).
313. Id. at para. 15-1506(f)(1).
314. Id. at para. 15-1506(f)(4).
315. Id. at para. 15-1506(f)(14).
316. Id. at para. 15-1506(g).
317. Id. at para. 15-1506(h) (court approval of any such deferral is required).
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has special importance to mechanics' lien claimants and to other
junior lienholders who can avoid the expense and time of proving
their claims until the extent of available funds from the sale is
known.31 8
The notice of sale provisions under the IMFL also reflect the
effort to promote a sale price at or near fair market value. The
IMFL establishes minimum requirements that a notice of sale
should meet. 319 Further, the Act requires that the notice be pub-
lished once on each of three consecutive weeks between thirty-five
days and seven days prior to the sale. 320 Most importantly, how-
ever, the Act requires that an advertisement be published in a
newspaper circulated to the general public in the section where real
estate is usually advertised as well as in the legal notices section of
the same paper or a different paper.32' The notice in the regular
real estate section should attract lay people, as well as lawyers and
other professionals, to foreclosure sales.
5. Reinstatement and Redemption
In addition to delaying the judicial sale until after the expiration
of the redemption period,322 the IMFL has made several other
changes concerning the mortgagor's rights of reinstatement3 23 and
318. The Act establishes mortgage lien priority by recognizing that mortgages under
construction loans, id. at para. 15-1302(b)(1), reverse mortgages, id. at para. 15-
1302(b)(2), revolving credit mortgages, id. at para. 15-1302(b)(3), and certain other ad-
vances, id. at para. 15-1302(b)(4) and (5) shall be liens from the time the mortgage is
recorded.
319. Id. at para. 15-1507(c)(1). This paragraph provides:
The notice of sale shall include at least ... : (A) the name, add;ess and tele-
phone number of the person to contact for information regarding the real estate;
(B) the common address and other common description... of the real estate;
(C) a legal description of the real estate sufficient to identify it with reasonable
certainty; (D) a description of the improvements on the real estate; (E) the times
specified in the judgment. . . when the real estate may be inspected prior to the
sale; (F) the time and place of the sale; (G) the terms of the sale; (H) the case
title, case number and the court in which the foreclosure was filed; and (I) such
other information as ordered by the Court.
Id. However, the Act also provides that an "immaterial error in the information shall
not invalidate the legal effect of the notice." Id.
320. Id. at para. 15-1507(c)(2).
321. Id. at para. 15-1507(c)(2)(i) (advertisements in the real estate section need not
include legal descriptions, unless the paper does not have a separate section for legal ads,
and only the advertisements in the real estate section are published). See also P.A. 85-907,
1987 Il1. Legis. Serv. 143 (West) (to be codified at ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, para. 15-1507(c)(2)(i)).
322. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, para. 15-1507(b) (1987). See supra notes 304-11 and
accompanying text.
323. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, para. 15-1602 (1987).
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redemption324 . For example, the applicable time period for the
mortgagor to reinstate the mortgage has been changed. Under
prior law, the mortgagor possessed the right to reinstate the mort-
gage by curing all existing defaults before the earlier of the expira-
tion of ninety days after the date of service or the entry of a
judgment of foreclosure. 32  The IMFL, however, eliminates the
second prong of the timing requirement regarding the entry of a
judgment of foreclosure. Hence, the right to reinstate must be ex-
ercised within ninety days of the date on which all the mortgagors
have been served, or within ninety days of the date on which the
mortgagors have otherwise submitted to the jurisdiction of the
court, without regard to the entry of judgment.326 The Act also
clarified the requirement that a mortgagor not be allowed to rein-
state a mortgage for five years after the date of the dismissal of a
foreclosure proceeding in which the same mortgage previously had
been reinstated.327
Under prior law328 and in some situations under the IMFL,329
the statutory redemption period extends for six months. As previ-
ously indicated, however, the redemption period no longer runs
after the foreclosure sale.33° Instead, the IMFL has modified the
redemption period for non-residential real estate to end six months
from the date on which the mortgagor was served with summons
or by publication or submitted to the court's jurisdiction, or three
months from the date of entry of a judgment of foreclosure, which-
ever is later.33' Moreover, the IMFL provides for an extended re-
demption period for a foreclosure of a mortgage on real estate
which is residential at the time the foreclosure is commenced. In
cases involving residential foreclosures, the redemption period ends
on the later of the date seven months332 from the date on which the
mortgagor was served with summons or by publication or submit-
ted to the court's jurisdiction, or three months from the date of
324. Id. at para. 15-1603.
325. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 95, para. 57 (1981) (curing the default required the pay-
ment of the installments in default plus costs, expenses and reasonable fees); see also, H.
Siegan & I. Helfgot, A Guide to Mortgage Foreclosure, 65 Cm. B. REC. 8, 12, 13 (1983).
326. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, para. 15-1602 (1987).
327. Id. (the five year limitation becomes applicable only upon an express written
finding by the court that the mortgagor has previously exercised the right to reinstate).
328. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, para. 12-128 (1985) (repealed 1987).
329. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, para. 15-1603(b) (1987) (involving real estate which is
non-residential real estate at the time the foreclosure is commenced).
330. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, para. 12-128 (1985) (repealed 1987).
331. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, para. 15-1603(b) (1987).
332. The redemption period applying to non-residential real estate is six months.
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, para. 15-1603(b) (1987).
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entry of a judgment of foreclosure.333
In addition to changing the length of the redemption period, the
IMFL places several important restrictions on the mortgagor's
right of redemption. For example, once the right of redemption
has expired, it may not be revived.33 4 Also, an owner of redemp-
tion who intends to redeem must provide the mortgagee with a
written notice of such intent at least fifteen days prior to the date
designated for redemption. 335 Finally, under the IMFL, a mortga-
gor has no equitable right of redemption after a judicial sale or
after entry of a judgment of foreclosure.336 Rather, the right to
redeem is purely statutory.
6. Rights of Possession
The IMFL retained, but clarified, many of the concepts of prior
law regarding the rights of parties to possession 337 of the foreclo-
sure property and also made significant adjustments to those
rights.338 Moreover, the legislature expressly structured the IMFL
to serve as the exclusive source of law regarding possession during
333. Id. In addition to the extra redemption period of one month following the fore-
closure sale afforded to residential mortgagors under paragraph 15-1603(b) of the Act,
other protections for the residential mortgagor have been included in the IMFL. For
example, mortgagors of real estate that is residential or agricultural at the time of such
attempted waiver may not waive their rights of reinstatement and redemption, except
when a foreclosure proceeding has been commenced. Id. at para. 15-1601(a) and (c).
The Act, however, is silent about whether a non-residential or non-agricultural mortga-
gor may waive the right to reinstate. Also, although prior law required the mortgagor
remaining in possession during foreclosure to pay the mortgagee the fair rental value of
the real estate, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, para. 15-309 (1985) (repealed 1987), the IMFL
allows the mortgagor to pay the lesser of the interest due under the mortgage as if no
default occurred or the fair rental value of the real estate. ILL. REV. STAT. para. 15-
1701(c)(2) (1987).
334. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, para. 15-1603(c)(1) (1987). But see, id. at para. 15-
1604(a) (residential mortgagors have a special right to redeem for a period of thirty days
following the confirmation of the sale).
335. Id. at para. 15-1603(e). Arguably, in the absence of timely notice, the right to
redeem would effectively cease fifteen days before the end of the full redemption period.
That is, because the Act requires notice of intent to redeem at least fifteen days prior to
the exercise of the right to redeem, a court may consider a mortgagor's failure to provide
such notice as jurisdictional. Id. Also, following receipt of such a notice of intent to
redeem, the mortgagee must file with the clerk of the court a certification of expenses
authorized by the court and incurred between the date of judgment and the date of re-
demption. If the mortgagee fails to file such certification, the mortgagee shall not be enti-
tled to payment for those expenses. Id.
336. Id. at para. 15-1605.
337. The Act defines possession as including physical possession of the mortgaged
real estate to the same extent to which the mortgagor would have been entitled to physi-
cal possession had the foreclosure action not been brought. Id. at para. 15-1701(a).
338. Id. at paras. 15-1701 to -1706.
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foreclosure. 339 The Act addresses the rights of the parties during
three time periods: the period prior to the entry of judgment of
foreclosure, 3 ° the period between the judgment of foreclosure and
thirty days after the confirmation of the sale,341 and the period fol-
lowing thirty days after the confirmation of sale.342
Regarding the period prior to the entry of a judgment of foreclo-
sure, the IMFL retains the basic structure of the prior law.343
Now, as before, the court has wide discretion in determining
whether to place the mortgagee in possession of the real estate. 3"
In the past, however, the courts in some counties rarely granted
such possession to the mortgagee. Although the parties continue
to rely on the court's discretion under the IMFL, the Act has es-
tablished a more functional procedure for exercising that discre-
tion. The Act distinguishes between foreclosures involving
residential real estate345 and all other foreclosures.346 Regarding
residential property, the mortgagor is entitled to retain possession
of the real estate in the initial period unless the mortgagee objects
and shows good cause3 47 why the court should not allow such pos-
session to continue.34  As to the non-residential mortgage, how-
ever, the burden of proof shifts to the mortgagor to show good
cause why the mortgagee should not be put in possession. 49
The IMFL applies basically the same standards to the second
time period 350 as was applied in the first period.35 ' After a sale
pursuant to the judgment, however, any holder of the certificate of
339. Id. at para. 15-1701(a).
340. Id. at para. 15-1701(b).
341. Id. at para. 15-1701(c).
342. Id. at para. 15-1701(d).
343. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, para. 15-302 (1985) (repealed 1987).
344. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, para. 15-1701(b) (1987).
345. Id. at para. 15-1701(b)(1).
346. Id. at para. 15-1701(b)(2).
347. The drafters of the Act rejected a statutory definition of "good cause" with the
anticipation that a consistent standard would be developed by Illinois courts. Liss, supra
note 254, at 17.
348. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, para. 15-1701(b)(1) (1987) (i.e., under a residential
mortgage, the mortgagee carries the burden of proving good cause.).
349. Id. at para. 15-1701(b)(2). Although the non-residential mortgagor carries the
burden of proof, the mortgagee must still request to be put in possession upon allegations
that the mortgage authorizes the mortgagee to be put in possession and when a reason-
able probability exists that the mortgagee will prevail on a final hearing of the cause. Id.
See also, id. at para. 15-1706(a).
350. Id. at para. 15-1701(c) (the period between the judgment of foreclosure and
thirty days after the confirmation of sale).
351. Id. at para. 15-1701(c)(1).
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sale receives the mortgagee's right to be placed in possession.3 5 2
Also, prior law required the mortgagor remaining in possession
during foreclosure to pay the mortgagee the fair rental value of the
real estate.353  The IMFL, however, allows the mortgagor to
choose between the lesser of the payments of interest due under the
mortgage as if no default occurred and the fair rental value of the
real estate.354 During the third period, which begins thirty days
after confirmation of the foreclosure sale, the holder of the certifi-
cate of sale is entitled to possession of the foreclosed real estate
without notice or further order of the court.3 55
The IMFL also provides for the appointment of a receiver upon
the request of any party and a showing of good cause.356 The Act
grants the receiver the power to operate, manage, and conserve the
property and describes certain specific powers of a receiver. 357
Also, the Act provides that the receiver shall operate the property
with reasonable prudence, taking into account the interests of the
mortgagor.3 58 This provision reflects the drafters' intent to rely on
the mortgagee in possession unless the mortgagor shows the neces-
sity of an impartial administrator or a need for special expertise.35 9
VIII. CONCLUSION
The most notable development in the area of real property law
during the Survey period involved the enactment of the new Illinois
Mortgage Foreclosure Law. The Real Property Section of the Illi-
nois State Bar Association (the "Association") began drafting the
IMFL in an attempt to revise and restructure the mortgage fore-
closure law of Illinois. 36° The Association's incentive for undertak-
ing such a task was the apparent widespread dissatisfaction with
the existing law. The most notable problems with the old law were
its disorganization, and its failure to achieve a balance between the
risks to the bidder due to the timing of the Sheriff's sale. It also
appeared that few defense attorneys achieved sufficient familiarity
352. Id.
353. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, para. 15-309 (1985) (repealed 1987).
354. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, para. 15-1701(c)(2) (1987).
355. Id. at para. 15-1701(d).
356. Id. at para. 15-1704(a).
357. Id. at para. 15-1704(b) (including the power to execute leases, collect rents, in-
sure the property, hire employees, and pay taxes).
358. Id. at para. 15-1704(c).
359. Liss, supra note 254, at 17.
360. Fred I. Feinstein served as chairman of the Real Property Law Section of the
Illinois State Bar Association when the section began drafting a revision of the Illinois
mortgage foreclosure laws. -ED.
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with this specialized area and, therefore, could not adequately de-
fend foreclosure suits.
The Association's goals, therefore, were: (1) to consolidate as
much as possible the law of mortgage foreclosure into one statute;
(2) to revise the law to balance the rights of lenders and borrowers;
and (3) to place potential purchasers of the foreclosed property in a
more favorable position in the hopes that such property would be
purchased at a price more closely related to that property's fair
market value.
When the Association started this project, it intended to address
power of sale and how mechanics' liens should be treated in mort-
gage foreclosure actions. In fact, the first drafts of the proposed
statute established foreclosure by power of sale as well as an out-
line of a modified mechanics' lien procedure. The Association
soon realized, however, that the proposed modifications were po-
tentially unpopular with the state legislature. Even so, some are
arguing that certain provisions of the IMFL are designed to com-
pletely erode the Mechanics' Lien Act. Although it seems that this
is not the case, only time will tell how the new provisions will be
interpreted by the courts. There is a strong possibility, however,
that mechanics' lien claimants will no longer be able to prevent the
property from being sold by delaying the resolution of the mort-
gage foreclosure suit. The impact of the IMFL will not be as mate-
rial as the first outline of the proposed law, but the IMFL should
achieve the modified goals of its drafters.
In other areas, the willingness of the United States Supreme
Court to address land use issues is significant because land use is an
area which recent Supreme Courts have traditionally refused to ad-
dress. Although the cases noted in this article are not as definitive
as the press would make them appear, their importance will be felt
as state courts and local governments evaluate and reevaluate their
powers.
The inconsistency in the various state court decisions relating to
the liability of real estate brokers has been reflected in this year's
Illinois court decisions as well. Because of the important role of
brokers in real estate transactions, identification of their responsi-
bilities to both buyers and sellers under the facts of each case
should continue to result in frustration for the real estate practi-
tioner in advising clients.
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